Penalties of the Great Patriotic War. The truth about the penalty box of the Great Patriotic War

Let us remind you , that the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942 provided for the formation of two types of penal units: penal battalions (800 people each), where middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers were sent who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and penal companies ( from 150 to 200 people each), where ordinary soldiers and junior commanders were sent for the same offenses. When sent to a penal battalion, officers, and sergeants to a penal company, were subject to demotization to privates.
Penal battalions were units of front-line subordination (from one to three per front), and penal companies were army units (from five to ten per army, depending on the situation).
The formation of penal battalions and companies began already in August 1942. On September 28 of this year, by order of the USSR NKO No. 298, signed by G.K. Zhukov, provisions on a penal battalion and a penal company were announced.
What is provided by the Regulations on the penal company? It is said that the organization, numerical and combat composition, as well as salaries for the permanent composition of penal companies are determined by a special staff. A penal company, by order of the military council of the army, is assigned to the rifle regiment or division or brigade in whose sector it is assigned.
By order of the army, the strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers were sent to the permanent composition of the companies. The commander and military commissar of the penal company enjoyed the authority of the commander and military commissar of the division in relation to the penal prisoners. The length of service in ranks for officers of a penal company was halved, and the salary was doubled. When assigning a pension, a month of service in a penal company was counted as six.
Never during the entire war - let us emphasize this from the very beginning - was there and could not be a case where a penal company or a platoon within it was commanded by a penal officer.
The penal officers were called a variable composition of the company, and of these, the Regulations allowed the appointment of only squad commanders with the rank of corporal, junior sergeant and sergeant.
Penal units are not our invention, as rightly stated in the order of the USSR NPO No. 227. The Germans threw penal units into battle already in the first weeks of the war on the Soviet-German front. Moreover, for penal prisoners, the length of stay in the battalion was not set in advance, although the possibility of rehabilitation was also not excluded. In the diary of the well-known Franz Halder, penal prisoners were mentioned already on July 9, 1941. On that day, the head of the OKH organizational department, Major General Walter Bule, called the organization of penal units a very good and useful idea. The Germans used some penal battalions in battles in the East in 1941, others in mine clearance work in the West. In September 1941, when the 16th German Army failed in the area of ​​Lake Ladoga and the 8th Panzer Division was driven back with losses, the Nazis sent everything they had into battle, including a penal battalion in the most dangerous area. This is also stated in Halder's diary.
In war, apparently, life itself suggests the idea of ​​penal formations. Should anyone who has committed a criminal or military crime be removed from combat formations in order to be sent with a sentence to safer places? In a penal company, you can atone for guilt without a criminal record, without loss of honor.
So, On August 8, 1942, even before receiving the order with the situation, a penal company began to be formed in the 57th Army. At first, only one - 1st. By order of the military council No. 0398, Lieutenant P.P. was appointed its commander. Nazarevich, who had six months of experience in participating in battles. Junior Lieutenant N.M. was appointed his deputy. Baturin, also tested by fire.
The company staff, in addition to the commander and his deputy, provided for the positions of three platoon commanders, three of their deputies in combat units, the head of records management - treasurer and paramedic in officer rank.

According to archival reporting and statistical documents, 427,910 penal prisoners, or 1.24 percent of the total strength of the Red Army for the entire period of the war (34,496,700 people) passed through penal battalions and penal companies from their creation in 1942 until their disbandment in 1945.

An impressive composition of political workers was also envisaged: a military commissar, a company agitator and three platoon political instructors.
Political workers began to join the 1st separate penal company in October, after the restoration of unity of command in the Red Army - no longer as military commissars and political instructors, but as deputy commanders for political affairs. The first political officer of the company, Grigory Bocharov, still had the old rank of political instructor (he soon left for the 90th separate tank brigade as a captain). All deputy platoon commanders for political affairs were lieutenants: A. Stepin, I. Koryukin and N. Safronov. Lieutenant M. Miloradovich was appointed company agitator.
From October 25, 1942, Vasily Klyuev became the company's paramedic, who for some reason had to wear the now abolished rank of military paramedic for a long time.
As you can see, the permanent composition of the company included 15 officers. The sixteenth was seconded, although he was in it on all types of allowances. At first he was the commissioner of the special department of the NKVD, and from April 1943 - the detective officer of the counterintelligence department "Smersh" - a structure of the People's Commissariat of Defense.
During the war, the officer corps of the penal company was reduced to 8 people. Of the political workers, only one agitator remained.
In the 1st penal company, like in any other, there was a small permanent core of privates and junior commanders: a company foreman, a clerk - captain, a medical instructor and three platoon orderlies, a GAZ-AA truck driver, two grooms (riders) and two cooks They were more a matter of numbers than of combat strength, although they carried the wounded out of the field and delivered food and ammunition to positions. If all the company officers were young, without pre-war experience in command service, then the Red Army soldiers and junior commanders of the permanent staff represented the older age of the mobilized. For example, company sergeant Dmitry Evdokimov, holder of the Order of the Red Star, celebrated his 50th birthday during the war.

But we'll come back in 1942, the 57th Army, from August 6, fought heavy defensive battles as part of the South-Eastern (from September 30, Stalingrad) Front, thwarting enemy attempts to break through to Stalingrad from the south. The 1st penal company, not yet fully staffed with permanent personnel, received its baptism of fire on October 9, 1942 at 23.00. The commander of the 15th Guards Rifle Division, who had the company at his disposal, ordered it, after artillery and mortar preparation, to shoot down enemy outposts at a height of 146.0, to the left of it - in three trenches and go to the pond, on the southern outskirts of which there was a hangar, and there hold the line with a perimeter defense until the main forces arrive.
In companies, combat orders are given verbally. But Lieutenant P. Nazarevich issued his first order for battle in writing. The company was divided into three assault groups... However, we will not go deeper into tactics. Let us note that the penal company accomplished its first combat mission. In that battle, two penal prisoners were killed: squad leader Sergeant V.S. Fedyakin and Red Army soldier Ya.T. Tanochka. The platoon commander, who led the assault group aimed at height 146.0, Lieutenant Nikolai Kharin, also died a hero’s death. The dead were buried near the very hangar that was owned by the enemy before the battle. 15 people were wounded in the first battle.
Meanwhile, the company was replenished with both penal prisoners and permanent personnel. Lieutenant Nazarevich did not accept everyone. He returned Maria Grechanaya, who was assigned to the company as a Red Army medical instructor, to the 44th Guards Rifle Regiment as not suitable for the staff of the penal company. Later, already in 1943, another company commander did not accept medical service lieutenant A.A. for the position of paramedic. Vinogradov, and at the end of the war, the girl cook was returned to the army reserve regiment without explanation, preferring the previous male cooks. But in penal battalions, both permanent and variable, women were still found.
At the defensive stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, the company suffered relatively small losses. There is, apparently, an explanation for this: penalties were rarely placed in the defense, they were reserved for active actions - offensive, reconnaissance in force. On November 1, 1942, the first group of penal prisoners, who had served the entire period prescribed by order in the company, consisting of seven people, was sent from the 1st penal unit to regular units. Moreover, N.F. Vinogradov and E.N. Konovalov were restored to the rank of sergeant.
Meanwhile, another penal company was formed in the 57th Army - the 2nd separate one. The companies, one might say, kept in touch with each other: sometimes they exchanged, replenishing each other before the battle, with a variable composition, and helped out during redeployment by horse-drawn transport.
On November 19, 1942, our troops launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad. But the 57th Army at that time was involved in encircling and blocking enemy troops in Stalingrad itself, and their liquidation began later. The 1st penal company, located in the Tatyanka-Shpalzavod area, did not have a variable composition for some time. On November 21, it was given a new number - 60th (the 2nd penal company of the 57th Army became the 61st) and was quickly brought into service. Only from the 54th penal company, stationed in Tashkent, far from the front, 156 people were sent at once, from Ufa - 80, from the army transit point - 20. The composition of the company even went beyond its usual numerical limits.
The battles that broke out in the ruins of Stalingrad were bloody. On January 10, 1943, platoon commanders Lieutenants A.N. were killed in assault attacks. Shipunov, P.A. Zhuk, A.G. Bezuglovich, company commander senior lieutenant P.P. was injured. Nazarevich, company agitator Lieutenant M.N. Miloradovich, deputy platoon commanders, junior lieutenants Z.A. Timoshenko, I.A. Leontyev. On the same day, 122 penalty prisoners died or were injured, atoning for their guilt with life and blood.
Senior Lieutenant Nazarevich, evacuated through the divisional medical battalion to the hospital, was replaced at the command post by his deputy for political affairs, Lieutenant Ivan Smelov. He performed command duties until the end of the fighting in the city. Very heavy fighting - from January 23 to 30, 1943, the company lost another 139 people wounded and killed.

Penal companies almost never located in populated areas. If the order for a company indicates the location of its deployment, it means that there are no penalty cells in it, only a permanent composition. At the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 60th penal unit was only permanently stationed in the village. Tatyanka, then to the village of Zaplavnoe.
But the order of May 20, 1943 is already tied to Rzhev, which is very distant from Stalingrad. The fact is that in February 1943, the 57th Army was transferred to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, its troops were transferred to other armies, and the field control was renamed the field control of the 68th Army. The permanent staff of the 60th Penal Company, including the cooks, became part of this administration and was transferred to Rzhev. Here Lieutenant I.T. Smelov returned to his duties as deputy company commander for political affairs, and Lieutenant Mikhail Dyakov became commander.
Probably, some readers will find the listing of so many names unnecessary. But we will not spare a newspaper line for them. After all, those who commanded penal units, constantly served in their composition, were rarely mentioned in the press during the war and even after the Victory, for obvious reasons. Meanwhile, they consciously and without any guilt shared with the penal prisoners all the dangers and risks of their special situation. Furthermore. The penalty convict, having received even a slight wound, was sent as one who had atoned for his guilt to the previous, calmer part. This did not apply to permanent officers: having recovered from injury, they returned to the company to their previous position and, it happened, died a month or two later. This is exactly what happened with platoon commanders Lieutenants Mikhail Komkov, Ivan Danilin, and Senior Lieutenant Semyon Ivanushkin. Their fate is bitter: wounded - hospital - return to the company and death in the next battle.
In Rzhev, the 60th separate penal company did not have a variable composition from May 20 to June 14, 1943. On June 15, the first 5 penal soldiers arrived from the army transit point. Then, in small groups, those who had been at fault began to arrive from the 159th, 192nd, 199th Infantry Divisions, from the 3rd Assault Engineer Brigade, the 968th Separate Signal Battalion and other parts of the army.
On August 26, 1943, Senior Lieutenant M. Dyakov was replaced as commander of the 60th Penal Company by Senior Lieutenant Denis Belim. The company was used for combat on the last day of the Elninsk-Dorogobuzh offensive operation on September 7. Advancing in the area of ​​the villages of Suglitsa and Yushkovo, the company lost 42 people killed and wounded. Senior Lieutenant Belim, who had just been appointed commander, also fell in battle. 10 people who showed special courage from Yushkov were sent ahead of schedule to the 159th Infantry Division, and two to the 3rd Engineer Brigade.
On September 7, the day of that memorable battle, Captain Ivan Dedyaev took over the company. Already under his command, the penalty soldiers liberated the village of Bobrovo from the enemy, losing another 28 people killed and 78 wounded.

At first On November 1943, the 68th Army was disbanded and the 60th Penal Company was transferred to the 5th Army, which became famous during the defense of Moscow. While maintaining the previous permanent core, it was reorganized into the 128th separate army penal company.
Before the new year, 1943, December 31, captain I.M. Dedyaev handed over the company to senior lieutenant Alexander Korolev. On New Year's Eve, the company commander, who had barely had time to look around, was in for trouble: the post of the barrier detachment of the 5th Army, which the penal soldiers encountered for the first time, detained 9 Red Army soldiers of variable composition outside the company's location and, as always did, escorted them for trial in
203rd Army Reserve Infantry Regiment.
In almost all films dedicated to penal prisoners, script authors and directors at some stage bring them together with a detachment. Moreover, the barrier detachments show off almost in full dress uniform, wearing caps from another department with a blue top, with brand new PPSh and, of course, with a heavy machine gun. They defiantly take a position behind the penalty box in order to prevent their retreat with fire in case of an unsuccessful attack. This is fiction.
Even before the order of the USSR NKO No. 227, in the first months of the war, commanders and political workers, on their own initiative, began to create units called upon and capable of, through their determination, or even participation in the same battle, stopping the retreating, bringing them to their senses, and uniting them again into a team, organized and controlled group. They, these units, legalized back in September 1941 by the Supreme Command, became the prototype of the barrage detachments.
Later, when the armies, by order No. 227, formed barrage detachments as separate military units subordinate to the military council, units in divisions with similar tasks began to be called barrage battalions. Depending on the situation on the fronts, they were either abolished or revived. If a penal company transferred to a division, having faltered in battle, could have encountered some kind of obstacle during retreat or flight, then it was precisely this battalion. No one had or wore blue caps. The same earflaps, quilted jackets, the same caps that the penalty box wears.
Not a single Red Army soldier of the variable composition of the 1st, 60th, 128th penal companies died from friendly fire. And no one ever shot over his head as a warning. The barrier detachments, as representatives of the internal army structure, were themselves pretty much burned by fire and knew: in battle anything can happen, a person is a person and in the face of mortal danger it is important to support him with an example of composure and perseverance. Losses in barrage detachments of any affiliation were also serious.
On January 10, 1944, a little more than a week after being appointed company commander, Senior Lieutenant Korolev and platoon commander Lieutenant A.Kh. Tetyanyk were wounded in the battle. Along with them, 93 penalty prisoners were injured, 35 died.
Already the company commander, Lieutenant Alexander Mironov, was wounded two weeks later. In the February battles near Gzhatsk - from the 4th to the 10th - the 128th penal company lost almost its entire variable composition: 54 people died, 193 ended up in medical battalions and a hospital with injuries. In those days, senior lieutenant Vasily Bussov took over the company. Bussov, who was wounded on February 28, was replaced by senior lieutenant I.Ya. Korneev. Having been wounded on March 20, he gave up his command post to senior lieutenant V.A. Ageev. Ageev was taken to the division's medical battalion on April 10. On the same day, the company was headed by senior lieutenant K.P. Soloviev...
Just a list of names. But isn’t the tension of the fighting felt behind it? Doesn’t it give rise to thoughts that the penalty officers were really entrusted with the most difficult and most dangerous tasks, as prescribed by Order No. 227 of the NCO of the USSR?
Before the Smolensk offensive operation, the army personnel department recalled senior lieutenant Konstantin Solovyov to its disposal. The 128th penal company was taken over by Guard captain Ivan Mateta. Under his command, the penalty soldiers fought near the villages of Podnivye, Starina, and Obukhovo. The losses were relatively small. But already in Lithuania, in the Kaunas region, where the company, along with many other units, broke through the enemy’s defenses, success was fully paid for in blood: 29 fallen and 54 wounded. Five days later, in the battle for Zapashki and Servydy, the company suffered new losses: 20 killed, 24 wounded.
On August 18, 1944, the 128th penal company with a certain solemnity sent 97 Red Army soldiers and sergeants who had served their sentences to the 346th Infantry Regiment. And without any celebrations they accepted exactly 100 new penalty prisoners from the 203rd AZSP.

Perhaps, It's time to say: who are they, fines? Those who showed cowardice and instability in battle already constituted a minority of them. By Order of the NKO of the USSR No. 413 of August 21, 1943, regimental commanders of the active army and division commanders in military districts and on inactive fronts were authorized by their authority to send unauthorized persons, deserters, and those who showed incompetence, squandered property, and grossly violated the rules of the guard duty to penal companies. services.

Penal companies have the goal of giving ordinary soldiers and junior commanders of all branches of the military, who have been guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, the opportunity to atone with blood for their guilt before the Motherland through a brave fight against the enemy in a difficult area of ​​​​combat operations.
(From the Regulations on penal companies in the active army).

For example, a cadet of the military aviation school of pilots, who had studied for more than a year and had been stealing from the unit and his colleagues all this time, ended up in the 128th penal company for three months. The order from the head of the school says that, as the investigation showed, he stole watches, insulated jackets, overcoats, tunics, sold all this, and lost the proceeds at cards.
An inexhaustible stream of those who deserted and settled in enemy-occupied territory during the retreat of the Red Army in the first weeks and months of the war, as well as those partially liberated from enemy captivity, were sent to penal companies.
If a person lagging behind the army under dubious circumstances did not attempt to reach his own people, but also did not cooperate with the occupation authorities, then he was sent to a penal company for one month. Those who served as elders and policemen under the Germans received two months. And those who served in the German army or in the so-called Russian Liberation Army (ROA), the traitor Vlasov has three. Their fate was determined in the army reserve rifle regiment in accordance with the order of the NPO.
There was a case when, after an appropriate check, 94 former Vlasovites were immediately sent to the 128th separate penal company. They fought back, like all other categories of those who had been at fault: some atoned for their guilt with blood, some with death, and those who were lucky - with full serving of their sentences. I have never met anyone released early from such a contingent.
It was extremely rare for convicts from prison to end up in penal companies. The 128th company received such people only once - 17 people sent through the Far Eastern military registration and enlistment offices. This shouldn't be surprising. Back in 1941, by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 12, August 10 and November 24, more than 750 thousand people who had committed minor crimes before the war and were fit for service were sent from prison to the troops. At the beginning of 1942, another 157 thousand people were released for the army. All of them fought as part of regular units; there were no penalties yet. And if a certain proportion of these people, as the archives convince us, later ended up in the penalty box, it was for their actions at the front.
Those who committed serious crimes, including so-called counter-revolutionary ones, were prohibited from being sent to the army. The suspension of execution of the sentence provided for by the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1926 until the end of hostilities could not be applied to them.
Apparently, in isolated cases, as a result of some judicial errors, individuals convicted of banditry, robbery, robbery, and repeat thieves ended up in penal companies. How else to explain order No. 004/0073/006/23 dated January 26, 1944, signed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR A.M. Vasilevsky, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, People's Commissar of Justice of the USSR N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin, who obliged the judicial authorities and the bodies of formation and staffing of troops to completely exclude such cases.
None of the convicts, of course, could be sent to the penal unit voluntarily.
Of course, some Red Army soldiers who ended up in the penalty box evoke sympathy. In the 128th penal company, for example, an elderly fighter was serving a month’s sentence, during whose duty a pair of baggage horses disappeared. I didn’t notice...
In a very dynamic life, companies and incidents occurred that affected the destinies of people. In the 203rd AZSP, Red Army soldier Babayev Kurbandurdy, who had no record of any offenses, was mistakenly included in one of the penalty groups. They sent a follow-up order with an explanation. The company commander decided to leave the soldier in the company, transferring him to the permanent staff to fill the vacant position of a medical orderly.
Somehow they made a mistake in the company itself, presenting one of the penal prisoners to the military council of the army for early release as someone who had been wounded. But in the regiment, the authorized officer of the Smersh ROC did not find this wound and, through the commander, returned the soldier to serve his sentence to the end.
In the penal company, relationships were regulated by general military regulations of the Red Army. Ordinary soldiers of variable composition addressed their immediate superior - the squad commander, the same penal officer, with the word “comrade” and in case of negligence they could receive punishment from him. They also called the commander - officer - comrade, and not “citizen”, as shown in one of the television films.
The penal company commander made full use of the disciplinary rights of the division commander. Sometimes he punished guilty platoon officers with house arrest. I didn’t forget to reward him for his efforts. The company sergeant major, for example, in connection with his fiftieth birthday at the height of the fighting, was granted leave to go home for a period of 45 days. The May Day orders for the company, in which the diligence of many penal prisoners were noted with gratitude, are received with excitement.
The penal company, as part of the army subordination, was sometimes better equipped with weapons and provided with food and fodder than the linear companies.

War With Nazi Germany, the 128th penal company ended in East Prussia. The fighting there was fierce. In one of them - for the town of Plissen - the company commander, Major Ramazan Temirov, a native of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the company agitator, Captain Pavel Smirnyagin, the only company political worker at that time called from the Novosibirsk region, were killed with one machine-gun burst. They were buried with military honors southwest of Plissen in a local cemetery.
The company suffered its last losses in the Baltic States on April 14, 1945 near the village of Kobnaiten: 8 dead and 56 wounded.
And then the 5th Army under the command of N.I. Krylov, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, and its 128th penal company went to the Far East to beat the Japanese. The company did not suffer any losses in the Harbin-Girin offensive operation, except for a trophy gelding named Orlik who fell ill while still on the road and was left at the Minino station of the Krasnoyarsk railway. In Primorye, the penal company was located in the vicinity of the regional center of Chernigovka, then in Grodekovo, Spassky district. There the company was commanded by Senior Lieutenant S.A. Kudryavtsev, then senior lieutenant V.I. Brykov.
The fact that the penal units were filled with people who were dashing, unpredictable in behavior, and prone to excesses is evidenced by the following fact: the few alternating fighters finishing their stay in the 128th penal company managed to cause some kind of brawl in Gradekovo. Four were detained by local police and placed under investigation. Senior Lieutenant V. Brykov was forced by one of his last orders to exclude them from the company lists and remove them from all types of allowance. In this regard, you think: if the guilt of those under investigation is established, it will no longer be possible to atone for it front-line, without a criminal record. Penal companies as a redemptive institution became history.
Vasily Ivanovich Brykov was destined, on the basis of the directive of the headquarters of the 5th Army No. 0238 of October 28, 1945, to disband the company. The last to leave it were the senior lieutenant of the medical service, already mentioned in these notes, Vasily Klyuev (only he, a paramedic, a veteran of the unit, by that time had the right to call himself a Stalingrader) and the head of production - the treasurer, senior lieutenant of the quartermaster service, Philip Nesterov. Nesterov’s archive and company seal, by the way, were accepted only after he reimbursed the cost of somehow lost food containers from his own pocket.

If Speaking of serious things, from August 1942 to October 1945, 3,348 penal prisoners passed through the 1st, 60th, 128th penal companies, the documentation of which constitutes one archival file. 796 of them died for their homeland, 1,929 were injured, 117 were released after the deadline established by the order, and 457 were released ahead of schedule. And only a very small part, about
1 percent, fell behind on the marches, deserted, was captured by the enemy, and went missing.
In total, 62 officers served in the company at different times. Of these, 16 were killed and 17 were injured (three of the wounded were later killed). Many have received awards. The Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, was awarded to Captain I. Mateta, Senior Lieutenant L. Lyubchenko, Lieutenants T. Boldyrev, A. Lobov, A. Makaryev; Patriotic War II degree - senior lieutenant I. Danilin, lieutenants A. Makaryev, I. Morozov; Red Star - senior lieutenant I. Danilin, captain I. Lev, senior lieutenants L. Lyubchenko, P. Ananyev (operational officer of the Smersh ROC at the 128th company), junior lieutenant I. Morozov, captains R. Temirov and P. Smirnyagin . As you can see, some officers were awarded orders more than once.
The Order of the Red Star, Glory III degree, medals “For Courage” and “For Military Merit” were also awarded to 43 Red Army soldiers and sergeants of variable composition. The fines were not rewarded very generously, but they were rewarded nonetheless.
Among those few who returned to their native regiment from the penal company with an award were Red Army soldiers Pyotr Zemkin (or Zenkin), Viktor Rogulenko, Artem Tadzhumanov, Mikhail Galuza, Ilya Dranishev. Machine gunner Pyotr Logvanev and machine gunner Vasily Serdyuk were posthumously awarded orders.
And one last thing. Penal companies were separate military units with all their inherent attributes, separate military farms. Thanks to this status, they were all included in List No. 33 of rifle units and subunits (individual battalions, companies and detachments) of the active army, compiled by the General Staff after the war. The company in question is listed in it many times: as the 1st separate penal company of the 57th Army (1942), as the 60th separate penal company (1942 - 1943) and, finally, as the 128th separate penal company of the 5th Army (1943 -1945). In reality it was the same company. Only the number, seal, subordination and field address changed.
This is how the story based on documents developed about one of the penal companies, which was not much different from other penal units created in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, memorable to all front-line soldiers
No. 227 “Not a step back!” It may not be of interest to every reader, but I think it will allow anyone to mentally compare what they read with what they were offered in artistic form to take on faith by the television series that caused discussions in society.

To begin with, a little educational information about what a penal battalion is and the history of this phenomenon. Penal units are special military formations in the army, where during war or hostilities, guilty military personnel who have committed a variety of crimes are sent as a kind of punishment. For the first time in Russia, penal formations appeared in September 1917, however, due to the complete collapse of the state and the collapse of the army, these units did not take part in the battles and were subsequently disbanded. Penal battalions in the Red Army appeared on the basis of Stalin's order No. 227 of July 28, 1942. Formally, these formations in the USSR existed from September 1942 to May 1945.

Myth 1. “Penal units in the Red Army were numerous, half of the Red Army soldiers fought in penal battalions.”

Let us turn to the dry statistics of the number of fines in the USSR. According to archival statistical documents, the number (rounded) of penal prisoners in the Red Army: 1942. - 25 t. 1943 - 178 t. 1944 - 143 t. 1945 - 81 tons. Total - 428 tons. Thus, a total of 428 thousand people were in penal units during the Great Patriotic War. If we take into account that during the Great Patriotic War, 34 million people passed through the ranks of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the proportion of soldiers and officers who were penalized was no more than 1.25%. Based on the above statistical data, it becomes clear that the number of penal battalions is greatly exaggerated and the influence of penal units on the general situation is at least not decisive.

Myth 2. “Penal units were formed only from prisoners and criminals of the USSR.”

This myth breaks the actual text of Order No. 227 itself. “...Form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and put them on more difficult sections of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.” For ordinary soldiers and junior commanders guilty of similar violations, from 5 to 10 penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each) were created within the army. Thus, it is worth distinguishing between a penal company and a battalion; these are fundamentally different combat units.

Penal battalions were formed from officers who had committed offenses before the socialist fatherland, and not from criminals who were specially collected into a separate battalion so that “the Germans would kill them.” Of course, not only military personnel could end up in penal units; persons convicted by the authorities of the Soviet Union were also sent, but courts and military tribunals were prohibited from sending persons convicted as punishment to penal units who were involved in counter-revolutionary activities, as well as persons those convicted of robbery, robbery, repeated theft and all persons who had previous convictions for the above crimes, as well as those who deserted from the Red Army more than once. In other cases, in order to send a person to serve in a penal unit, the identity of the convicted person, the details of the crime and other details of the case were taken into account. Not everyone and not everyone had the chance to atone for their crime with blood before their homeland.

Myth 3. “The penal battalions were ineffective.”

However, on the contrary, penal battalions were distinguished by serious combat effectiveness and placed these units in the most dangerous and difficult sectors of the front. The penal battalions did not need to be forcibly raised into battle; the desire to return the officer's shoulder straps and rehabilitate themselves before the Motherland was extremely great.

According to the memoirs of Alexander Pyltsin (Russian and Soviet writer, participant in the Great Patriotic War, historian. He was awarded twice the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree, the Order of the Red Banner and the medal “For Courage”): “Our units were urgently transferred to the most dangerous direction , strengthening the regiment's battle formations. Mixed with his soldiers, we noticed that there was some kind of revival in their ranks. After all, they understood that next to them, in the role of ordinary fighters, were recent officers in a variety of ranks and they would go on the attack together. And it was as if some fresh, irresistible force had poured into them.”

During the attack on Berlin, the penalty soldiers were ordered to be the first to cross the Oder and create a bridgehead for the rifle division. Before the battle, they reasoned like this: “At least some of the more than a hundred penal prisoners of the company will swim, and if they swim, then they have not yet had impossible tasks. And even if they capture a small bridgehead, they will hold it until the last. Penalties will have no way back,” Pyltsin recalled.

Myth 4. “The soldiers of the penal units were not spared and were sent to slaughter.”

Usually this myth goes along with the text from Stalin’s order No. 227 “...to put them in more difficult sectors of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.” However, for some reason they forget to cite special points from the “Regulations on penal battalions of the active army”, which states: “Clause 15. For combat distinction, a penitentiary may be released early upon the recommendation of the command of the penal battalion, approved by the military council of the front. For particularly outstanding combat distinction, the penalty soldier is also presented with a government award.” Based on this, it becomes clear that the main thing for exemption from punishment by a penal battalion is not death and “shedding of blood,” but military merit.

Of course, the penal units lost more soldiers than the usual garrisons of the Red Army, but we should not forget that they were sent to “the most difficult sectors of the front,” while the penal units showed their combat effectiveness. For example, according to the results of the Rogachev-Zhlobin operation in February 1944, when the Eighth Penal Battalion operated behind enemy lines in full force, out of just over 800 penal soldiers, about 600 were transferred to regular units of the Red Army, without “shedding blood”, namely for military merits to the Motherland. A rare combat mission carried out by penalty soldiers remained without the attention of the command and rewarding the soldiers. The command was interested in serving the punishment of the Red Army soldiers in penal units and in carrying out orders, and not in their senseless death at the front. At one time, K.K. Rokossovsky well described the words “atone with blood” as nothing more than an emotional expression designed to sharpen the sense of duty and responsibility in the war for one’s guilt.

Myth 5. “Penalty officers went into battle without weapons.”

In fact, the penal battalions had weapons no worse than in ordinary units of the Red Army, and in some places even better, this was due to the fact that these units were sent, as a rule, only to “the most difficult sectors of the front.” From the memoirs of the above-mentioned A.V. Pyltsyna: “I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that our battalion was constantly replenished with new weapons in sufficient quantities. We already had the new PPSh assault rifles, which were not yet widely used among the troops, instead of the PPD. We also received new PTRS (i.e. Simonovsky) anti-tank rifles with a five-round magazine. In general, we never experienced a shortage of weapons.

I am talking about this because it was often stated in post-war publications that penalty prisoners were driven into battle without weapons or were given one rifle for 5-6 people, and everyone who wanted to arm themselves wished for the speedy death of the one who got the weapon. In army penal companies, when their number sometimes exceeded a thousand people, as officer Vladimir Grigorievich Mikhailov (unfortunately, now deceased), who then commanded such a company, told me many years after the war, there were cases when they simply did not have time to transport the required number weapons and then, if there was no time left for additional armament before completing an urgent combat mission, some were given rifles, and others were given bayonets from them. I testify: this in no way applied to officer penal battalions. There were always enough weapons, including the most modern ones.”

Thus, when approaching the issue of penal units, in no case can we talk about the uselessness of such units, much less deny the heroism of the soldiers who fought for the freedom and independence of the socialist Fatherland just like other parts of the Red Army. At the same time, in no case can one say that everything was based on penal units, that there were penal units all around and that they were used as “cannon fodder.” This is real blasphemy towards people who went through the penal divisions of the USSR.

TsAMO RF. Card index of the Military Medical Museum for hospital records.
Pyltsyn A.V. “Penal battalion in battle. From Stalingrad to Berlin without detachments.”
Pyltsyn A.V. “Pages of the history of the 8th penal battalion of the First Belorussian Front.”

You're better off chopping down forests to make coffins - Penal battalions are heading into the breakthrough!

Vladimir Vysotsky “Penal battalions”

As you understand from the quote from Vysotsky’s song, the topic of this article is the penal units of the Red Army. Let's take a closer look at them. During the Great Patriotic War, our penal units were divided into a penal battalion and a penal company. They were created according to the well-known order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin. for No. 227 dated July 28, 1942. Which stated, among other things:

"1. To the military councils of the fronts and, above all, to the commanders of the fronts:

c) form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them on more difficult sections of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood.

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

c) form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders who have violated discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against their Motherland with blood.”

Subsequently, all soldiers and commanders of the Red Army found guilty by military tribunals of committing both military and ordinary crimes began to be sent to such penal units. At the same time, criminal punishment such as imprisonment was replaced by serving the sentence in a penal battalion or penal company. Long periods of time in penal cells were not given, so imprisonment for a period of 10 years was equivalent to three months in a penal battalion or company. The minimum period was 1 month.

“Penalties” who were wounded or distinguished themselves in battle were eligible for early release with restoration to their previous rank and rights. Those who died were automatically restored to rank, and their relatives were given a pension “on the same basis as all families of commanders.” All penal prisoners who have served their sentences are “submitted by the battalion command to the military council of the front for release and, upon approval of the presentation, are released from the penal battalion.” All those released were also restored to rank and all their awards were returned to them.

On September 28, 1942, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank Shchadenko, issued order No. 298, which announced the provisions on penal battalions and penal companies, as well as the staff of the penal battalion, penal company and barrage detachment.

According to these documents, military personnel of penal units were divided into permanent and variable composition. The permanent staff was recruited “from among the strong-willed commanders and political workers who most distinguished themselves in battle.” For the special conditions of military service, they received appropriate benefits, for example, in relation to calculating length of service. The permanent composition of the penal battalion included the battalion command, headquarters and control officers, company and platoon commanders, political leaders of companies and platoons, foremen, clerks and company medical instructors. In a penal company, the permanent staff included the company commander and military commissar, the company clerk, commanders, political instructors, foremen and platoon medical instructors.

As we can see, the command staff of penal units consisted not of penal soldiers, but of specially selected commanders and political workers, since not every commander was able to manage such a specific unit as penal battalions and companies, where it was necessary not only to be able to command correctly, but also to The decisive moment of the battle is to raise and lead the penalty box into the attack. Which contradicts the modern film “Penal Battalion”, where in the battalion even the commander (Serebryannikov) is a penalty officer.

As for the variable composition, that is, penal officers, regardless of their previous military rank, they served as privates, but could be appointed to junior command positions. So former colonels and captains with rifles, machine guns and machine guns in their hands strictly followed the orders of lieutenants, commanders of penal platoons and companies.

Not only guilty servicemen were sent to penal units of the Red Army. Persons convicted by the judiciary were also sent there, but courts and military tribunals were prohibited from sending to penal units those convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes, banditry, robbery, robbery, repeat thieves, persons who had already been convicted in the past for the crimes listed above, as well as repeatedly deserted from the Red Army. In other categories of cases, when deciding on the issue of deferring the execution of a sentence with sending a convicted person to the active army, courts and military tribunals, when passing a sentence, took into account the personality of the convicted person, the nature of the crime committed and other circumstances of the case. Not everyone was given the opportunity to atone for their guilt with blood at the front.

At the same time, I want to emphasize that it was precisely persons convicted by the judicial authorities who were sent, whose imprisonment was replaced by serving their sentence in penal units. But persons who had already served a sentence in prison and applied to be sent to the front were sent to regular rifle units after amnesty. At the same time, it was also prohibited to send persons convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes and especially serious ones. In relation to commanders who were repressed in the 30s and released in the pre-war or initial period of the war, a different procedure was used. Their criminal cases were removed from the archives and reviewed, then the verdicts were overturned due to the lack of evidence of a crime. Very often, K.K. Rokossovsky is cited as an example, which is not true, since no verdict was ever passed against him, and the trial was postponed and the case was sent for further investigation due to the fact that all the prosecution witnesses were already dead. The case was subsequently dropped. As believed in connection with Tymoshenko's petition. Here is another commander - Alexander Vasilyevich Gorbatov was indeed sentenced on May 8, 1939 under Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (“counter-revolutionary crimes”) to 15 years in prison and 5 years of loss of rights. He served his sentence in a camp in Kolyma. Released after a review of the case on March 5, 1941. After reinstatement in the army and treatment in sanatoriums, in April of the same year he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the 25th Rifle Corps in Ukraine.

By the way, during the war years in the Red Army there was another type of penal units. In 1943, separate assault rifle battalions appeared in the Red Army. So on August 1, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order No. Org/2/1348 “On the formation of separate assault rifle battalions,” which prescribed:

“In order to provide the opportunity for command and control personnel who were for a long time in territory occupied by the enemy and did not take part in partisan detachments, with arms in hand to prove their devotion to the Motherland.”

These penal units were formed only from contingents of command and control personnel held in special (filtration) camps of the NKVD. At the beginning, 4 such assault battalions were formed, each numbering 927 people. Assault battalions were intended for use in the most active sectors of the front. The length of stay of personnel in individual assault rifle battalions was established at two months of participation in battles, either until awarding an order for valor in battle or until the first wound, after which personnel, if they have good certifications, can be assigned to the field troops for the corresponding command positions - commanding staff."

Subsequently, the formation of assault battalions was continued. Their combat use was, in principle, no different from penal battalions, although there were differences. Thus, unlike penal prisoners, those who were sent to assault battalions were not convicted and deprived of their officer ranks, and accordingly they were treated differently. The families of personnel assigned to battalions from special camps of the NKVD were given all the rights and benefits defined by law for the families of the commanding personnel of the Red Army. There was one more difference between assault battalions and ordinary penal battalions, so if in penal battalions (as in penal companies) permanent personnel occupied all positions, starting with platoon commanders, then in assault battalions only the positions of battalion commander and his deputy for political affairs belonged to the permanent composition , chief of staff and company commanders. The remaining positions of middle and junior command staff were occupied by the fighters themselves from the personnel of the assault battalion.

The armament of the penal units of the Red Army was no different from the equipment of regular rifle units. The same Mosin rifles, PPSh-41, Maxim and Goryunov machine guns.

I would like to note that during the war there were cases when the penalty status was removed from an entire unit:

“At the end of August 1942, the 163rd penal company of the 51st Army repelled an enemy attack supported by ten tanks in a defensive battle. Being cut off from its troops, the company fought its way out of the encirclement, and on September 1st it took part in an offensive battle and only retreated to its original positions upon orders. The soldiers and commanding officers of the company carried the wounded for 60 kilometers. By order of the military council of the army, the rank of penalty was removed from the company.”

Penal units existed in the Workers' and Peasants' Union from September 1942 to May 1945. In total, 427,910 people were sent to penal units throughout the war. On the other hand, 34,476.7 thousand people passed through the Armed Forces of the USSR during the war. It turns out that the share of military personnel who served in penal companies and battalions is only 1.24% of the total personnel of the Red Army.

Finally, it is worth noting that penal battalions and companies turned out to be one of the most persistent units of the Red Army. It’s worth saying here that the barrier detachments behind them are just a myth. The barrage detachments created in 1942 were located behind unstable divisions, and not behind penalty boxes. Pyltsyn Alexander Vasilievich, who once commanded a penal battalion, states:

“Having fought in a penal battalion from 1943 until the end of the war, I dare to say that there were never barrage detachments or other intimidating forces behind our penal battalion. According to order No. 227, barrier detachments were created in order to place them in the rear of “unstable divisions.” But the penal battalions turned out to be extremely resilient and combat-ready, and barrage detachments in the rear of these units were simply not needed. Of course, I can’t talk about all penal units, but after the war I met many who fought in penal battalions and penal companies and never heard of the barrier detachments behind them.”

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In periodicals and published literature, there are a number of myths and legends about penal units of the Red Army: “penal units turned into a kind of military prison”; for them, the Soviet Army “invented reconnaissance in force”; With their bodies, the penalty soldiers cleared minefields; penal battalions were “thrown into attacks on the most inaccessible areas of the German defense”; Penalties were “cannon fodder”; their “lives were used to achieve victory during the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War”; criminals were not sent to penal formations; the penal battalions did not have to be supplied with ammunition and provisions; Behind the penal battalions there were blocking detachments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) with machine guns and others.

The published material reveals on a documentary basis the process of creation and combat use of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments. They were first created in the Red Army during the Civil War. The experience of their creation was used during the Great Patriotic War. The formation of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments began with Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense (NKO) of the USSR I.V. Stalin dated July 28, 1942. What caused the appearance of this document, dubbed the order “Not a step back!”?

Formation of penal battalions and companies

During the successful counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow and its general offensive that then unfolded, the enemy was thrown back 150-400 km to the west, the threat to Moscow and the North Caucasus was eliminated, the situation in Leningrad was eased, and the territories of 10 regions of the Soviet Union were liberated in whole or in part. The Wehrmacht, having suffered a major defeat, was forced to switch to strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front. However, many operations of the Red Army remained unfinished due to the Supreme High Command's overestimation of the capabilities of its troops and underestimation of the enemy's forces, dispersal of reserves, and inability to create decisive superiority in the most important sectors of the front. The enemy took advantage of this, and in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 he again seized the initiative.

Miscalculations made by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the command of a number of fronts in assessing the situation led to new defeats of Soviet troops in the Crimea, near Kharkov, southeast of Leningrad and allowed the enemy to launch a major offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy advanced to a depth of 500-650 km, broke through to the Volga and the Main Caucasus Range, and cut communications connecting the central regions with the south of the country.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to: irrevocable - 2064.1 thousand people, sanitary - 2258.5 thousand; tanks - 10.3 thousand units, guns and mortars - about 40 thousand, aircraft - more than 7 thousand units. But, despite the heavy defeats, the Red Army withstood a powerful blow and, in the end, stopped the enemy.

I.V. Stalin, taking into account the current situation, on July 28, 1942, as People's Commissar of Defense, signed order No. 227. The order stated:

“The enemy is throwing ever new forces at the front and, regardless of the great losses for him, climbs forward, rushes into the depths of the Soviet Union, captures new areas, devastates and ruins our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population. Fighting is taking place in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south and at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German occupiers are rushing towards Stalingrad, towards the Volga and want to capture Kuban and the North Caucasus with their oil and grain riches at any cost. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuiki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, and half of Voronezh. Units of the troops of the Southern Front, following the alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without orders from Moscow, covering their banners with shame.

The population of our country, who treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to become disillusioned with it and loses faith in the Red Army. And many curse the Red Army because it is putting our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, while it itself is fleeing to the east.

Some stupid people at the front console themselves by saying that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of land, a lot of population and that we will always have plenty of grain. With this they want to justify their shameful behavior at the front.

But such conversations are completely false and deceitful, beneficial only to our enemies.

Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our funds are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy has captured and is trying to capture, is bread and other products for the army and home front, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, and railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, there are much fewer people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million pounds of grain per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year. We no longer have a superiority over the Germans either in human reserves or in grain reserves. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory we leave behind will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defenses, our Motherland, in every possible way.

Therefore, we must completely stop the talk that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is large and rich, there is a lot of population, there will always be plenty of grain. Such conversations are false and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, because if we do not stop retreating, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and factories, without railways.

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.

No step back! This should now be our main call.

We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last opportunity.

Our Motherland is going through difficult days. We must stop, and then push back and defeat the enemy, no matter the cost. The Germans are not as strong as the alarmists think. They are straining their last strength. To withstand their blow now, in the next few months, means ensuring victory for us.

Can we withstand the blow and then push the enemy back to the west? Yes, we can, because our factories and factories in the rear are now working perfectly, and our front is receiving more and more planes, tanks, artillery, and mortars.

What do we lack?

There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, tank units, and air squadrons. This is now our main drawback. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend our Motherland.

We cannot tolerate any more commanders, commissars, and political workers whose units and formations leave combat positions without permission. We cannot tolerate it any longer when commanders, commissars, and political workers allow a few alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, so that they drag other fighters into retreat and open the front to the enemy.

Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.

From now on, the iron law for every commander, Red Army soldier, and political worker must be the requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command.

Commanders of a company, battalion, regiment, division, corresponding commissars and political workers who retreat from a combat position without orders from above are traitors to the Motherland. Such commanders and political workers must be treated as traitors to the Motherland.

This is the call of our Motherland.

To carry out this order means to defend our land, save the Motherland, destroy and defeat the hated enemy.

After their winter retreat under the pressure of the Red Army, when discipline weakened in the German troops, the Germans took some harsh measures to restore discipline, which led to good results. They formed more than 100 penal companies from soldiers who had violated discipline due to cowardice or instability, placed them in dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. They formed, further, about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, deprived them of their orders, placed them in even more dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins. They finally formed special barrage detachments, placed them behind unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot panickers on the spot if they attempted to leave their positions without permission or if they attempted to surrender. As you know, these measures had their effect, and now the German troops are fighting better than they fought in the winter. And so it turns out that the German troops have good discipline, although they do not have the lofty goal of defending their homeland, but have only one predatory goal - to conquer a foreign country, and our troops, who have the lofty goal of defending their desecrated homeland, do not have such discipline and tolerate due to this defeat.

Shouldn't we learn from our enemies in this matter, just as our ancestors learned from their enemies in the past and then defeated them?

I think it should.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army orders:

1. To the military councils of the fronts and, above all, to the commanders of the fronts:

A) unconditionally eliminate retreating sentiments in the troops and suppress with an iron fist the propaganda that we can and should allegedly retreat further to the east, that such a retreat will supposedly cause no harm;

B) unconditionally remove from post and send to Headquarters to bring to court martial the army commanders who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the front command;

C) form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them on more difficult sections of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland.

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of corps and divisions who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the army command, and send them to the military council of the front to be brought before a military court;

B) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;

C) form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against their homeland with blood.

3. To commanders and commissars of corps and divisions:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions that allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of units without an order from the corps or division commander, take away their orders and medals and send them to the military councils of the front to be brought before a military court;

B) provide all possible assistance and support to the army’s barrage detachments in strengthening order and discipline in the units.

The order should be read in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, and headquarters.”

Order No. 227 makes no mention of the experience gained in the Civil War, but makes reference to the experience of the enemy, who practiced the use of penal battalions. The enemy's experience undoubtedly needed to be studied and creatively applied in practice. But Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, who during the Civil War was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Revolutionary Military Council of a number of fronts, had an idea about the creation of similar formations in the Red Army.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, assessing order No. 227, writes in the book “The Work of a Whole Life”: “This order immediately attracted the attention of all personnel of the Armed Forces. I was an eyewitness to how soldiers in units and subunits listened to him, officers and generals studied him. Order No. 227 is one of the most powerful documents of the war years in terms of the depth of patriotic content, the degree of emotional intensity... I, like many other generals, saw some harshness and categorical assessments of the order, but they were justified by a very harsh and alarming time. What attracted us to the order, first of all, was its social and moral content. He attracted attention with the severity of the truth, the impartiality of the conversation between the People's Commissar and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin with Soviet soldiers, from ordinary soldiers to army commanders. Reading it, each of us thought about whether we were devoting all our strength to the struggle. We were aware that the cruelty and categorical demands of the order came on behalf of the Motherland, the people, and what was important was not what penalties would be introduced, although this was important, but that it increased the consciousness of responsibility among the soldiers for the fate of their socialist Fatherland. And those disciplinary measures that were introduced by order had already ceased to be an indispensable, urgent necessity even before the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive at Stalingrad and the encirclement of the Nazi group on the banks of the Volga.”

Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov in his “Memoirs and Reflections” noted: “In some places, panic and violations of military discipline reappeared in the troops. In an effort to stop the decline in the morale of the troops, I.V. Stalin issued order No. 227 on July 28, 1942. This order introduced tough measures to combat alarmists and violators of discipline, and strongly condemned “retreat” sentiments. It said that the iron law for active troops should be the requirement “Not a step back!” The order was supported by intensified party-political work in the troops.”

During the Great Patriotic War, the attitude towards order No. 227 was ambiguous, as evidenced by documents of that time. Thus, in a special message from the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, senior state security major N.N. Selivanovsky, sent on August 8, 1942 to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank V.S. Abakumov, it was emphasized: “Among the command staff, the order was correctly understood and appreciated. However, amid the general upsurge and correct assessment of the order, a number of negative, anti-Soviet defeatist sentiments are recorded, manifesting themselves among individual unstable commanders...” Similar facts were cited in the report of the head of the political department of the Volkhov Front, Brigade Commissar K. Kalashnikov, dated August 6, 1942, to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.

After the publication of Order No. 227, measures were taken to bring it to the attention of personnel, to form and determine the procedure for the use of penal and barrage units and units. On July 29, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) A.S. Shcherbakov demanded that the heads of the political departments of the fronts and districts and the heads of the political departments of the armies “personally ensure that the People’s Commissar’s order is immediately communicated to units and subunits, read out and explained to all personnel of the Red Army.” In turn, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov, in Directive No. 360/sh dated July 30, ordered the commanders of fleets and flotillas to accept Order No. 227 “for execution and management.” July 31, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin signed Directive No. 1096, which ordered military prosecutors and tribunal chairmen to take “decisive measures to provide the command and political agencies with real assistance in fulfilling the tasks set in the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense.”

Even before the publication of order No. 227, the first penal company was created in the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front on July 25, 1942. On July 28, the day order No. 227 was signed, 5 separate penal companies were created in the active army, on July 29 - 3 separate penal battalions and 24 separate penal companies, on July 30 - 2 separate penal battalions and 29 separate penal companies, and on July 31 - 19 separate penal companies. The Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the Volga and Dnieper military flotillas had their own penal companies and platoons.

Who formed penal battalions and companies

August 10 I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky signed Directive No. 156595, which demanded that personnel convicted of sabotage or sabotage be transferred to penal tank companies, as well as to send “hopeless, malicious selfish tankmen” to penal infantry companies. Penal companies were created, in particular, in the 3rd, 4th and 5th tank armies.

On August 15, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army A.S. Shcherbakov signs Directive No. 09 “On political work to implement NGO Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942.” On August 26, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov issued an order “On the tasks of military tribunals to implement the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.” The procedure for recording military personnel assigned to penal battalions and companies was determined in Directive No. 989242 of the Red Army General Staff of August 28.

September 9, 1942 People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin signed order No. 0685, which demanded that “fighter pilots who evade combat with an air enemy should be brought to trial and transferred to penal units in the infantry.” The pilots were sent not only to penal infantry units. In accordance with the regulations developed in the same month at the headquarters of the 8th Air Army, the creation of three types of penal squadrons was envisaged: fighter squadrons on the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 aircraft, attack squadrons on the Il-2, and light bomber squadrons on the U-2.

September 10, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Major General of Artillery V.V. Aborenkov issued an order, according to which it was ordered to immediately send to penal rifle battalions “those guilty of negligent attitude towards the military equipment entrusted to them” from the 58th Guards Mortar Regiment.

On September 26, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense General of the Army G.K. Zhukov approved the provisions “On penal battalions of the active army” and “On penal companies of the active army.” Soon, on September 28, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko issued order No. 298, in which the following were announced to management:

"1. Regulations on penal battalions of the active army.

2. Regulations on penal companies in the active army.

3. Staff No. 04/393 of a separate penal battalion of the active army.

4. Staff No. 04/392 of a separate penal company of the active army...”

Despite the fact that the staff of penal battalions and companies were clearly defined by the relevant provisions, their organizational and staffing structure was different.

Order No. 323 of October 16, 1942, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko, the provisions of Order No. 227 were extended to military districts. Sent to penal units in accordance with Order No. 0882 of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Shchadenko on November 12, both those liable for military service and military personnel who feigned illness and so-called “mutilators” were subject to punishment. By order No. org/2/78950 of the Main Organizational and Staff Directorate of the Main Administration of the Red Army dated November 25, a single numbering of penal battalions was established.

December 4, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense A.S. Shcherbakov signs order No. 0931, according to which for “the soulless bureaucratic attitude towards the material and everyday needs of political workers who are in the reserve of GlavPURKKA at the Military-Political School. M.V. Frunze" were removed from their posts and sent to the active army in a penal battalion, the assistant head of the school for logistics, Major Kopotienko, and the head of the school's baggage supply, senior lieutenant of the quartermaster service, Govtvyanits.

According to order No. 47 of January 30, 1943, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Colonel General E.A. Shchadenko, junior lieutenant of the 1082nd Infantry Regiment Karamalkin was sent to a penal battalion for a period of 3 months and demoted to the ranks “for criticism, an attempt to slander his superiors and the corruption of discipline in his unit.”

According to Directive No. 97 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shadenko of March 10, 1943, it was required that “after a quick check, immediately send to penal units” former military personnel who “at one time surrendered to the enemy without resistance or deserted from the Red Army and remained to live in territory temporarily occupied by the Germans, or, finding themselves surrounded at their place of residence, they stayed at home, not wanting to go out with the Red Army units.”

By order No. 0374 of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 31, 1943, it was prescribed by the decision of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front to send to penal battalions and companies “persons of command who are guilty of interruptions in the nutrition of the soldiers or the lack of food supplies to the soldiers.” Employees of the Special Departments did not escape the fate of fines. On May 31, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Based on the results of an inspection of the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, Stalin issued order No. 0089, by which “for criminal errors in investigative work” investigators Sedogin, Izotov, Solovyov were dismissed from counterintelligence agencies and sent to a penal battalion.

By Order No. 413, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin on August 21, 1943, the command staff of military districts and inactive fronts was given the right to send military personnel to penal formations without trial “for unauthorized absence, desertion, failure to comply with orders, squandering and theft of military property, violation of the statutory rules of guard duty and other military crimes in cases where the usual disciplinary measures for these offenses are insufficient, as well as all detained deserters of sergeants and privates who fled from units of the active army and from other garrisons.

Not only male servicemen, but also women were sent to penal formations. However, experience has shown that it is inappropriate to send female military personnel who have committed minor crimes to penal cells. Therefore, on September 19, 1943, General Staff Directive No. 1484/2/org was sent to the chiefs of staff of fronts, military districts and individual armies, which demanded that female military personnel convicted of crimes not be sent to penal units.

In accordance with the joint directive of the NKVD/NKGB of the USSR No. 494/94 of November 11, 1943, Soviet citizens who collaborated with the occupiers were also sent to penal units.

In order to streamline the practice of transferring convicts to the active army, on January 26, 1944, order No. 004/0073/006/23 was issued, signed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin.

By order No. 0112 of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal G.K. Zhukov on April 29, 1944, the commander of the 342nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 121st Guards Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel F.A., was sent to a penal battalion for a period of two months. Yachmenev “for failure to comply with the order of the Military Council of the Army, for leaving the enemy advantageous positions and not taking measures to restore the situation, for showing cowardice, false reports and refusal to carry out the assigned combat mission.”

Persons who were careless and uncontrolled were also sent to penal units, as a result of which military personnel died in the rear, for example, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, signed in May 1944.

Practice has shown that when implementing this order, significant violations were committed, the elimination of which was directed by Order No. 0244, signed on August 6, 1944 by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Approximately the same kind of order No. 0935, concerning officers of fleets and flotillas, was signed on December 28, 1944 by the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov.

Military units were also transferred to the category of penalties. On November 23, 1944, People's Commissar of Defense Stalin signed order No. 0380 on the transfer of the 214th Cavalry Regiment of the 63rd Cavalry Korsun Red Banner Division (commander of the guard regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Danilevich) to the category of penalties for the loss of the Battle Banner.

The formation of penal battalions and companies was not always carried out successfully, as required by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. In this regard, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. On March 24, 1943, Zhukov sent directive No. GUF/1902 to front commanders, which demanded:

"1. Reduce the number of penal companies in armies. Collect penal prisoners into consolidated companies and, thus, keep them together, preventing them from being aimless in the rear and using them in the most difficult areas of combat operations.

2. In the event of a significant shortfall in penal battalions, introduce them into battle one by one, without waiting for the arrival of new penal battalions from command personnel in order to cover the shortfall of the entire battalion.”

The regulations on penal battalions and companies noted that permanent personnel (commanders, military commissars, political commissars, etc.) were appointed to positions by order of the front and army troops from among the strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers in battle. This requirement, as a rule, was fulfilled in the active army. But there were exceptions to this rule. For example, in the 16th separate penal battalion, platoon commanders were often appointed from among those who had redeemed their guilt. According to the provisions on penal battalions and companies for all permanent personnel, the terms of service in ranks, in comparison with the command, political and command staff of combat units of the active army, were reduced by half, and each month of service in penal formations was counted towards the assignment of a six-month pension. But this, according to the recollections of penal unit commanders, was not always followed.

The variable composition of penal battalions and companies consisted of military personnel and civilians sent to these formations for various offenses and crimes. According to our calculations, made on the basis of orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, People's Commissar of the Navy, Deputy People's Commissars of Defense, People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of State Security, about 30 categories of such persons have been identified.

So, the orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies clearly defined the types of offenses for which military personnel and other persons could be sent to penal units, as well as the circle of persons who had the right to send those guilty and convicted to penal units. The fronts and armies also issued orders regarding the procedure for the formation of penal units and subunits. Thus, by order No. 00182 of the commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov dated July 31, 1942, members of the command and political staff of the 85th Infantry Division, who were “the main culprits for the failure to complete the combat mission,” were sent to the front-line penal battalion, and “junior command and rank and file personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield” were sent to army penal company. On May 6, 1943, Directive No. 005 was issued by the front commander, Colonel General I.I. Maslennikov, who demanded that military personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield be sent to a penal battalion or tried by a military tribunal.

Published literature and memoirs of front-line soldiers contain information that commanders and superiors did not always adhere to the rules established in orders and directives. This, as the study showed, applied to approximately 10 categories of fines:

1. Unjustly convicted, who were slandered and slandered in order to settle scores with them.

2. The so-called “surrounded people” who managed to escape from the “cauldrons” and reach their troops, as well as those who fought as part of partisan detachments.

3. Military personnel who have lost combat and secret documents.

4. Commanders and superiors guilty of “criminally careless organization of the combat security and reconnaissance service.”

5. Persons who, due to their beliefs, refused to take up arms.

6. Persons who supported “enemy propaganda.”

7. Military personnel convicted of rape.

8. Civil prisoners (thieves, bandits, repeat offenders, etc.).

9. Fraudsters.

10. Employees of defense enterprises who committed negligence.

The published literature provides various information about equipping penal battalions and companies with weapons and military equipment. Some authors write that the penalty officers were armed only with light small arms and grenades, being “light” rifle units.” Other publications provide information about the presence of captured automatic weapons and mortars in the penal units. To carry out specific tasks, artillery, mortar and even tank units were temporarily subordinated to the commander of the penal unit.

Penal prisoners were provided with clothing and food supplies in accordance with the standards established in the army. But, in a number of cases, according to the recollections of front-line soldiers, there were violations in this matter. In some publications, for example I.P. Gorin and V.I. Golubev, it is said that in the penal units there was no normal relationship between permanent and variable personnel. However, the majority of front-line soldiers testify to the opposite: in penal battalions and companies, statutory relationships and strong discipline were maintained. This was facilitated by well-organized political and educational work, which was carried out on the same basis as in other parts of the active army.

Penal formations, staffed mainly from among military personnel of various military specialties, received additional training when there was time so that they were able to solve the tasks assigned to them.

According to the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study,” by the end of 1942 there were 24,993 penal prisoners in the Red Army. In 1943 their number increased to 177,694 people, in 1944 it decreased to 143,457, and in 1945 to 81,766 people. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, 427,910 people were sent to penal companies and battalions. Judging by the information included in List No. 33 of rifle units and units (individual battalions, companies, detachments) of the active army, compiled by the General Staff in the early 60s of the 20th century, then during the Great Patriotic War 65 separate penal battalions were formed and 1028 separate penal companies; a total of 1093 penalty parts. However, A. Moroz, who studied the funds of penal units stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, believes that during the war, 38 separate penal battalions and 516 separate penal companies were formed.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” states: “Penal units of the Red Army existed legally from September 1942 to May 1945.” In fact, they existed from July 25, 1942 to October 1945. For example, the 128th separate penal company of the 5th Army participated in the Harbin-Girin offensive operation, which was carried out from August 9 to September 2, 1945. The company was disbanded based on Directive No. 0238 of the 5th Army Headquarters dated October 28, 1945.

Penal battalions and companies were used in the most dangerous areas

As noted, much speculation exists regarding how penal battalions and companies were used. Moreover, the most common myth is that they served as a kind of “cannon fodder”. This is not true. During the Great Patriotic War, penal companies and battalions solved almost the same tasks as rifle units and subunits. At the same time, as ordered by Order No. 227, they were used in the most dangerous directions. They were most often used to break through enemy defenses, capture and hold important settlements and bridgeheads, and conduct reconnaissance in force. During the offensive, penal units had to overcome various types of natural and artificial obstacles, including mined areas. As a result, the myth that they “cleared minefields” with their bodies gained vitality. In this regard, we note that not only penal units, but also rifle and tank units repeatedly operated in directions where minefields were located.

The penalty units, in general, acted staunchly and courageously in defense. They participated in crossing water barriers, capturing and holding bridgeheads, and in combat operations behind enemy lines.

Due to the fact that penal formations were used in the most difficult sectors of fronts and armies, they, according to the authors of the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study,” suffered heavy losses. In 1944 alone, the total losses of personnel (killed, dead, wounded and sick) of all penal units amounted to 170,298 permanent personnel and penal prisoners. The average monthly losses of permanent and variable personnel reached 14,191 people, or 52% of their average monthly number (27,326 people). This was 3–6 times more than the average monthly losses of personnel in conventional troops in the same offensive operations in 1944.

In most cases, penal prisoners were released within the time limits established by the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies. But there were also exceptions, which were determined by the attitude of the command and military councils of the fronts and armies towards the penal units. For the courage and heroism shown in battles, penal prisoners were awarded orders and medals, and some of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Barrage detachments of the Red Army

In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, leaders of a number of party organizations, commanders of fronts and armies took measures to restore order in the troops retreating under enemy pressure. Among them is the creation of special units that performed the functions of barrage detachments. Thus, on the North-Western Front, already on June 23, 1941, in the formations of the 8th Army, detachments were organized from the withdrawn units of the border detachment to detain those leaving the front without permission. In accordance with the decree “On measures to combat parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the frontline zone,” adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 24, by decision of the military councils of the fronts and armies, barrage detachments were created from the NKVD troops.

On June 27, the head of the Third Directorate (counterintelligence) of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense, State Security Major A.N. Mikheev signed Directive No. 35523 on the creation of mobile control and barrier detachments on roads and railway junctions in order to detain deserters and all suspicious elements who penetrated the front line.

Commander of the 8th Army, Major General P.P. Sobennikov, who was operating on the North-Western Front, in his order No. 04 of July 1, demanded that the commanders of the 10th, 11th Rifle and 12th Mechanized Corps and divisions “immediately organize barrage detachments to detain those fleeing from the front.”

Despite the measures taken, there were significant shortcomings in the organization of the barrage service at the fronts. In this regard, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General G.K. Zhukov, in his telegram No. 00533 dated July 26, on behalf of the Headquarters, demanded that the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions and the commanders of the front troops “immediately personally figure out how the barrier service is organized and give comprehensive instructions to the chiefs of rear security.” On July 28, Directive No. 39212 was issued by the head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, State Security Commissioner 3rd Rank B.C. Abakumov on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line.

During the fighting, a gap formed between the Reserve and Central Fronts, to cover which the Bryansk Front was created on August 16, 1941 under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In early September, his troops, at the direction of Headquarters, launched a flank attack with the aim of defeating the German 2nd Panzer Group, which was advancing to the south. However, having pinned down very insignificant enemy forces, the Bryansk Front was unable to prevent the enemy group from reaching the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko turned to Headquarters with a request to allow the creation of barrage detachments. Directive No. 001650 Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated September 5th gave such permission.

This directive marked the beginning of a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. If before that they were formed by the bodies of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then by Special Departments, now the decision of Headquarters legitimized their creation directly by the command of the troops of the active army, so far only on the scale of one front. This practice was soon extended to the entire active army. September 12, 1941 Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov signed Directive No. 001919, which ordered that each rifle division have “a defensive detachment of reliable fighters of no more than a battalion (one company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles." The tasks of the barrage detachment were to provide direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, in stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel, without stopping before using weapons, in eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, etc.

On September 18, the military council of the Leningrad Front adopted resolution No. 00274 “On strengthening the fight against desertion and penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad,” according to which the head of the front’s military rear security was instructed to organize four barrage detachments “to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without documents."

On October 12, 1941, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. Stalin received a note in which he proposed to “organize a command group along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow” to organize the repulsion of enemy tanks, which would be given a “barrage detachment to stop the fleeing.” On the same day, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 765ss on the creation of a security headquarters for the Moscow zone under the NKVD of the USSR, to which the troops and regional organizations of the NKVD, police, fighter battalions and barrage detachments located in the zone were operationally subordinate.

In May-June 1942, during the fighting, the Volkhov group of troops of the Leningrad Front was surrounded and defeated. As part of the 2nd Shock Army, which was part of this group, barrier detachments were used to prevent escape from the battlefield. The same detachments operated at that time on the Voronezh Front.

On July 28, 1942, as already noted, Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. was issued. Stalin, which became a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. On September 28, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko signed order No. 298, which declared staff No. 04/391 of a separate barrage detachment of the active army.

Barrier detachments were primarily created on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the end of July 1942, I.V. Stalin received a report that the 184th and 192nd rifle divisions of the 62nd Army had abandoned the village of Mayorovsky, and the troops of the 21st Army had abandoned Kletskaya. On July 31, the commander of the Stalingrad Front V.N. Directive No. 170542 of the Supreme Command Headquarters, signed by I.V., was sent to Gordov. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, who demanded: “Within two days, form barrage detachments of up to 200 people each, using the best composition of the Far Eastern divisions that arrived at the front, which should be placed in the immediate rear and, above all, behind the divisions of the 62nd and 64th armies. The barrage detachments shall be subordinated to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. Place the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments.” The next day, General V.N. Gordov signed order No. 00162/op on the creation within two days of five barrage detachments in the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies, and in the 1st and 4th th tank armies - three defensive ones. At the same time, it was ordered to restore barrage battalions in each rifle division within two days, formed according to the Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 01919. By mid-October 1942, 16 barrage detachments were formed on the Stalingrad Front, and 25 on the Don, subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies.

On October 1, 1942, Chief of the General Staff Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky sent directive No. 157338 to the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, which spoke about the poor organization of the service of the barrier detachments and their use not for their intended purpose, but for conducting combat operations.

During the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), barrage detachments and battalions on the Stalingrad, Don and South-Eastern fronts detained military personnel fleeing the battlefield. From August 1 to October 15, 140,755 people were detained, of whom 3,980 were arrested, 1,189 were shot, 2,776 were sent to penal companies and 185 penal battalions, and 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

Commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, according to the report of the special department of the front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated October 30, 1942, proposed using barrier detachments to influence the infantry of the unsuccessfully advancing 66th Army. Rokossovsky believed that the barrage detachments should have followed the infantry units and forced the fighters to attack by force of arms.

Army barrage detachments and division barrage battalions were also used during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. In a number of cases, they not only stopped those fleeing the battlefield, but also shot some of them on the spot.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed massive heroism and self-sacrifice. This, however, does not mean that there were no cases of desertion, abandonment of the battlefield and panic. To combat these shameful phenomena, barrage formations were widely used.

In the fall of 1943, measures were taken to improve the structure of the barrage detachments. In directive 1486/2/org of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, sent on September 18 by the commander of the front forces and the 7th separate army, said:

"1. In order to strengthen the numerical strength of rifle companies, non-standard barrage detachments of rifle divisions, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 of 1941, are to be disbanded.

2. In each army, in accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227 of July 28, 1942, there must be 3-5 full-time barrage detachments according to the state No. 04/391, numbering 200 people each.

Tank armies should not have barrage detachments.”

In 1944, when the Red Army troops were successfully advancing in all directions, barrage detachments were used less and less. At the same time, in the front line they were used to the fullest. This was due to an increase in the scale of outrages, armed robberies, thefts and murders of the civilian population. To combat these phenomena, Order No. 0150 was sent to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky dated May 30, 1944

Barrage detachments were often used to solve combat missions. The incorrect use of barrage detachments was discussed in the order of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters G.K. Zhukov on March 29, 1943 as commander of the 66th and 21st armies. In the memorandum “On the shortcomings of the activities of the front troops’ detachments,” sent on August 25, 1944 by the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A.A. Lobachev to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel General A.S. Shcherbakov, noted:

"1. The barrier detachments do not perform their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrier detachments are used to protect army headquarters, protect communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc.

2. In a number of barrier detachments, the staffing levels of the headquarters have become extremely swollen...

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the barrier detachments, left them to their own devices, and reduced the role of the barrier detachments to that of ordinary commandant companies...

4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the barrier detachments, military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded...

Conclusion: Detachments for the most part do not carry out the tasks specified by the People's Commissar of Defense Order No. 227. Protecting headquarters, roads, communication lines, performing various household works and assignments, servicing commanders, supervising internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the function of barrier detachments of front troops.

“I consider it necessary to raise the question with the People’s Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of the barrier detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the current situation.”

However, it was not only the use of barrage detachments to perform tasks unusual for them that was the reason for their disbandment. By the fall of 1944, the situation with military discipline in the active army had also changed. Therefore I.V. On October 29, 1944, Stalin signed order No. 0349 with the following content:

“Due to the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

1. Disband individual barrage detachments by November 15, 1944. The personnel of the disbanded detachments will be used to replenish rifle divisions.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” notes: “In connection with the change for the better for the Red Army after 1943, the general situation on the fronts also completely eliminated the need for the further existence of barrage detachments. Therefore, all of them were disbanded by November 20, 1944 (in accordance with the order of the USSR NKO No. 0349 of October 29, 1944).

In recent years, films and publications have begun to appear, allegedly exposing loud, shocking moments in the history of the Great Patriotic War. However, at the heart of many topics that excite the public consciousness is the banal demand of the modern market for sensational information. One of such controversial and ambiguous pages in the history of the last war was penal companies and battalions. Clarity on this issue is brought both by the archive of the Second World War by the names of participants in disciplinary units, and by the memories of the veterans themselves. It must be said that many of those whose ancestors ended up in penal companies or battalions are not always sufficiently aware of the details of service in special conditions, because often the participants in those events preferred not to talk about the trials they had to go through.

History of education and foundations of the organization

Penal formations appeared in the Red Army in the summer of 1942 on the personal order of I.V. Stalin. The need for the formation of such disciplinary units was explained by the fact that the number of soldiers and officers who committed minor crimes was impressive enough to allow this category of military personnel to serve their sentences in prison in difficult wartimes. This state of affairs is confirmed by the military archive. A search by the names of those who fought as penal prisoners provides answers to questions regarding this phenomenon.
Soldiers and officers were placed in disciplinary units for offenses related to violation of regulations and failure to comply with orders, but did not entail serious consequences, as well as for cowardice, desertion, cowardice and sloppiness. Only officers were sent to penal battalions, and soldiers, sergeants and foremen were sent to penal companies. During the entire period of hostilities, there were 65 penal battalions and a little more than a thousand penal companies. The length of stay in formations of this type was limited to 3 months (or until the first injury). Officers who ended up in penal battalions were stripped of their ranks and awards, but after release, as a rule, their rights were fully restored. Nevertheless, for the heroism shown in battles, penal prisoners were often awarded orders and medals. The archive of the Second World War by the names of the participants contains in its repositories many personal files in which there are notes about heroic episodes during service in penal battalions.
The penal cells were commanded by simple career officers who had no penalties. Compared to commanders of regular combat units, these officers had some benefits and advantages. Women who served in the Red Army and committed offenses were not enrolled in penal units, but were sent to the rear.
There were similar disciplinary formations in the Wehrmacht army.

Truth and fiction

In cinema and modern literature one can observe a number of blunders related to penalty parts. These fabrications are completely refuted by the military archive; a search by last name in it clarifies many aspects of those events. For example, there is an opinion that a significant part of the penal prisoners were political prisoners and criminals, and some of them allegedly even led units at the level of commanders, or rather, bosses. In fact, by definition, there could be no prisoners in the penal battalions. A small number of criminal elements ended up in penal companies, but their dominance in the teams was out of the question.

Some so-called historians like to savor the myth that the penalty soldiers bore the brunt of the war on their shoulders. This is wrong. The number of soldiers and officers who passed through disciplinary battalions and companies throughout the Great Patriotic War barely exceeded 1% of the total number of all military personnel during the war period. Another thing is that penal battalions and penal companies always found themselves in the thick of it, which is why losses in these units significantly exceeded the average. Anyone who wants to verify this can personally look into the archives of the Second World War; By the names of the participants in the bloody battles, one can trace the military path of the formation and, accordingly, the number of losses. Just remember that soldiers from ordinary advanced regiments and divisions also fought desperately next to the penalty boxes.

Many modern films about the war colorfully demonstrate the cruelty of their own barrage detachments, which destroyed those who dared to retreat without orders, and this allegedly concerned penal units in the first place. And that's not true. Detachments did exist, but there were not as many of them as sensation hunters write about it, and they did not have any special regulations regarding penalty cells. By the way, the enemy also had similar barrage units.

We also have some literate people who claim that the fighters of the penal battalions were sorely short of weapons and that they were fed on a leftover basis. Fairy tales again! All military units on the front line were supplied with weapons and food equally. It’s just that, cut off from logistical support or finding themselves surrounded, any unit had difficulties with ammunition and food. It is incorrect to attribute this problem only to penalty parts.

Thus, you should not be ashamed if in the process it turns out that your ancestor at some point ended up in a penal battalion or a penal company - a military archive, a search by surname in which may well provide such information, often indicates sharp turns in the biographies of Red Army soldiers . Everyone makes mistakes, although the cost of misdeeds committed in wartime can be prohibitive. Nevertheless, many soldiers and officers who passed through disciplinary units atoned for their guilt with blood, and many performed great feats and were even awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

When writing the article, information was used from the memories of people who went through penal companies.

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