Theoretical and methodological argumentation. What should a five-point social studies essay be like? See what “theoretical argumentation” is in other dictionaries

Logical culture, which is an important part of the general human culture, includes many components. But the most important of them, connecting, as in an optical focus, all other components, is the ability to reason and argue.

Argumentation is the presentation of reasons, or arguments, with the intention of eliciting or strengthening the other party's (audience's) support for a position being advanced. “Argumentation” is also called a set of such arguments.

The purpose of argumentation is the audience’s acceptance of the proposed provisions. The intermediate goals of argumentation may be truth and goodness, but its ultimate goal is always to convince the audience of the justice of the position proposed to its attention and, possibly, the action suggested by it. This means that the oppositions “truth – false” and “good – evil” are not central either in the argumentation or, accordingly, in its theory. Arguments can be given not only in support of theses that appear to be true, but also in support of obviously false or vague theses. Not only good and justice can be defended by reasoning, but also what seems or later turns out to be evil. A theory of argumentation that proceeds not from abstract philosophical ideas, but from real practice and ideas about a real audience, must, without discarding the concepts of truth and goodness, place the concepts of “persuasion” and “acceptance” at the center of its attention.

In argumentation there is a distinction thesis- a statement (or system of statements) that the arguing party considers necessary to inspire in the audience, and an argument, or argument, – one or more related statements intended to support a thesis.

Argumentation theory explores the variety of ways to persuade an audience through speech. You can influence the beliefs of listeners or spectators not only with the help of speech and verbally expressed arguments, but also in many other ways: gesture, facial expressions, visual images, etc. Even silence in certain cases turns out to be a fairly compelling argument. These methods of influence are studied by psychology and art theory, but are not affected by the theory of argumentation. Beliefs can further be influenced by violence, hypnosis, suggestion, subconscious stimulation, medications, drugs, etc. Psychology deals with these methods of influence, but they clearly go beyond the scope of even the broadly interpreted theory of argumentation.

Argumentation is a speech act that includes a system of statements intended to justify or refute an opinion. It is addressed primarily to the mind of a person who is able, after reasoning, to accept or refute this opinion. The argumentation is thus characterized by the following features: it is always expressed in language, has the form of spoken or written statements, argumentation theory examines the relationships between these statements, and not the thoughts, ideas and motives that stand behind them; is purposeful activities, whose task is to strengthen or weaken someone’s beliefs; This social activity, insofar as it is directed at another person or other people, presupposes dialogue and an active reaction of the other party to the arguments presented; argumentation presupposes reasonableness those who perceive it, their ability to rationally weigh arguments, accept them or challenge them.

The theory of argumentation, which began to take shape in antiquity, has gone through a long history, rich in ups and downs. Now we can talk about the formation new theory of argumentation, emerging at the intersection of logic, linguistics, psychology, philosophy, hermeneutics, rhetoric, eristics, etc. The urgent task is to build a general theory of argumentation that answers questions such as: the nature of argumentation and its boundaries; methods of argumentation; the originality of argumentation in various fields of knowledge and activity, from the natural and human sciences to philosophy, ideology and propaganda; a change in the style of argumentation from one era to another due to changes in the culture of the era and its characteristic style of thinking, etc.

The central concepts of the general theory of argumentation are: persuasion, acceptance (of statements or concepts), audience, method of argumentation, position of the participant in argumentation, dissonance and consonance of positions, truth and value in argumentation, argumentation and evidence, etc.

The general outlines of a new theory of argumentation have emerged in the last two or three decades. It restores what was positive in ancient rhetoric and is sometimes called “new rhetoric” on this basis. It became obvious that the theory of argumentation is not reducible to the logical theory of evidence, which is based on the concept of truth and for which the concepts of persuasion and audience are completely foreign. The theory of argumentation is also not reducible to the methodology of science or the theory of knowledge. Argumentation is a certain human activity that takes place in a specific social context and has as its ultimate goal not knowledge in itself, but conviction in the acceptability of certain provisions. The latter may include not only descriptions of reality, but also assessments, norms, advice, declarations, oaths, promises, etc. The theory of argumentation is not limited to eristics– theories of dispute, because dispute is only one of many possible situations of argumentation.

In the formation of the main ideas of the new theory of argumentation, the works of H. Perelman, G. Johnston, F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst and others played an important role. However, even now the theory of argumentation is devoid of a single paradigm or a few competing paradigms and represents there is hardly a visible field of different opinions on the subject of this theory, its main problems and development prospects.

In the theory of argumentation, argumentation is considered from three different positions that complement each other: from the point of view of thinking, from the point of view person And society, and finally, from the point of view stories. Each of these aspects of consideration has its own specific characteristics and is divided into a number of divisions.

Analysis of argumentation as a human activity of a social nature involves research audiences, in which it unfolds. The narrowest audience includes only the one who puts forward a particular position or opinion and the one whose beliefs he seeks to strengthen or change. A narrow audience could be, for example, two people arguing, or a scientist putting forward a new concept and the scientific community called upon to evaluate it. The broader audience in these cases will be all those who are present during the argument, or all those who are involved in the discussion of the new scientific concept, including non-specialists recruited to one side through propaganda. The study of the social dimension of argumentation also involves analyzing the dependence of the manner of argumentation on the general characteristics of the specific integral society or community within which it occurs. A typical example is the peculiarities of argumentation in so-called “collectivistic (closed) societies” (totalitarian society, medieval feudal society, etc.) or “collectivistic communities” (“normal science”, army, church, totalitarian political party, etc.). The study of the historical dimension of argumentation includes three time slices:

Accounting for the historically specific time in which the argumentation takes place and which leaves its fleeting mark on it.

A study of the style of thinking of a historical era and those features of its culture that leave their indelible imprint on any argumentation related to a given era. Such a study allows us to identify five fundamentally different, successive types, or styles, of argumentation: archaic (or primitive) argumentation, ancient argumentation, medieval (or scholastic) argumentation, “classical” argumentation of the New Age and modern argumentation.

Analysis of the changes that argumentation undergoes throughout human history. It is in this context that it becomes possible to compare argumentation styles from different historical eras and raise questions about the comparability (or incomparability) of these styles, the possible superiority of some of them over others, and, finally, about the reality of historical progress in the field of argumentation.

The theory of argumentation treats argumentation not only as a special technique of persuasion and substantiation of put forward positions, but also as a practical art, which presupposes the ability to select from a variety of possible methods of argumentation the combination and configuration that are effective in a given audience and are determined by the characteristics of the problem under discussion.

In the most general sense, to substantiate a statement means to provide those convincing or sufficient reasons (arguments) by virtue of which it should be accepted.

Justification of theoretical propositions is, as a rule, a complex process that cannot be reduced to the construction of a separate conclusion or conducting a one-step empirical, experimental test. Justification usually includes a whole series of procedures relating not only to the position under consideration, but also to the system of statements, the theory of which it is an integral element. Deductive inferences play a significant role in the justification mechanism, although only in rare cases can the justification process be reduced to an inference or a chain of inferences.

The requirement for the validity of knowledge is usually called principle of sufficient reason. For the first time this principle was explicitly formulated by the German philosopher and mathematician G. Leibniz. “Everything that exists,” he wrote, “has sufficient grounds for its existence,” due to which not a single phenomenon can be considered valid, not a single statement true or fair without indicating its basis.

All diverse methods of justification, which ultimately provide sufficient grounds for accepting a statement, are divided into absolute And comparative. Absolute justification is the presentation of those convincing or sufficient reasons by virtue of which the justified position should be accepted. Comparative justification is a system of convincing arguments in support of the fact that it is better to accept the justified position than another position opposed to it. The set of arguments given in support of the justified position is called basis.

The general scheme, or structure, of absolute justification: “ A must be accepted into force WITH", Where A– justified position and WITH– basis of justification. Structure of comparative reasoning: “It is better to accept A, how B, by virtue of C." For example, the expression “We should accept that the sky is blue under ordinary conditions, since direct observation speaks in favor of this” is an absolute justification, its summary part. The expression “It is better to accept that the sky is blue than to accept that it is red, based on the principles of atmospheric physics” is the resulting stage of the comparative justification of the same statement “The sky is blue.” Comparative reasoning is sometimes also called rationalization: in conditions where absolute justification is unattainable, comparative justification represents a significant step forward in improving knowledge, in bringing it closer to the standards of rationality. Obviously, comparative justification is not reducible to absolute justification: if it has been possible to prove that one statement is more plausible than another, this result cannot be expressed in terms of the isolated validity of one or both of these statements.

The requirements of absolute and comparative validity of knowledge (its validity and rationality) play a leading role both in the system of theoretical and practical thinking, and in the field of argumentation. These requirements intersect and concentrate all other themes of epistemology, and it can be said that validity and rationality are synonymous with the ability of the mind to comprehend reality and draw conclusions regarding practical activities. Without these requirements, argumentation loses one of its essential qualities: it ceases to appeal to the minds of those who perceive it, to their ability to rationally evaluate the arguments presented and, on the basis of such an evaluation, accept or reject them.

The problem of absolute justification was central to modern epistemology. The specific forms of this problem changed, but in the thinking of this era they were always associated with its characteristic idea of ​​​​the existence of absolute, unshakable and irrevisible foundations of all genuine knowledge, with the idea of ​​​​gradual and consistent accumulation of “pure” knowledge, with the opposition of truth, which allows justification, and subjective values ​​that change from person to person, with the dichotomy of empirical and theoretical knowledge and other “classical prejudices.” We were talking about a method or procedure that would provide unconditionally solid, indisputable foundations for knowledge.

With the decomposition of “classical” thinking, the meaning of the problem of justification has changed significantly. Three points became apparent:

There are no absolutely reliable foundations and theoretical and especially practical knowledge that cannot be revised over time, and we can only talk about their relative reliability;

In the process of justification, numerous and varied techniques are used, the proportion of which varies from case to case and which are not reducible to some limited, canonical set of them, representing what can be called the “scientific method” or more broadly the “rational method”;

Justification itself has limited applicability, being primarily a procedure of science and related technology and not allowing for the automatic transfer of justification patterns that have developed in some areas (and above all in science) to any other areas.

In modern epistemology, the “classical” problem of justification has been transformed into the problem of studying the variety of ways to substantiate knowledge, devoid of clear boundaries, with the help of which an acceptable level of validity in a given field is achieved - but never absolute. The search for “solid foundations” of individual scientific disciplines has ceased to be an independent task, isolated from the solution of specific problems that arise in the course of the development of these disciplines.

Justification and argumentation are related to each other as a goal and a means: methods of justification together constitute the core of all diverse methods of argumentation, but do not exhaust the latter.

Argumentation uses not only correct methods, which include methods of justification, but also incorrect methods (lying or perfidy), which have nothing to do with justification. In addition, the argumentation procedure as a living, direct human activity must take into account not only the thesis being defended or refuted, but also the context of the argumentation, and, first of all, its audience. Techniques of justification (proof, reference to confirmed consequences, etc.), as a rule, are indifferent to the context of the argument, in particular to the audience.

Argumentation techniques can be and almost always are richer and more acute than justification techniques. But all methods of argumentation that go beyond the scope of methods of justification are obviously less universal and in most audiences less convincing than methods of justification.

Depending on the nature of the basis, all methods of argumentation can be divided into generally valid (universal) and contextual.

Generally valid argument applicable to any audience; efficiency contextual argumentation limited to certain audiences only.

Generally valid methods of argumentation include direct and indirect (inductive) confirmation; deduction of the thesis from accepted general provisions; checking the thesis for compatibility with other accepted laws and principles, etc. Contextual modes of argumentation include reference to intuition, faith, authority, tradition, etc.

It is obvious that contextual modes of argumentation are not always also modes of justification: say, reference to beliefs shared by a narrow friend of people, or to authorities recognized by this circle, is one of the common methods of argumentation, but is definitely not a mode of justification.

All the diverse methods of justification (argumentation), which ultimately provide “sufficient grounds” for accepting a statement, can be divided into empirical And theoretical. The former rely primarily on experience, the latter on reasoning. The difference between them is, of course, relative, just as the very boundary between empirical and theoretical knowledge is relative.

Empirical methods of justification are also called confirmation, or verification(from Latin verus - true and facere - to do). Confirmation can be divided into direct And indirect.

Direct confirmation is the direct observation of the phenomena referred to in the statement being verified.

Indirect confirmation is confirmation in experience of the logical consequences of the position being justified.

A good example of direct confirmation is the proof of the hypothesis about the existence of the planet Neptune: soon after the hypothesis was put forward, this planet was seen through a telescope.

French astronomer J. Le Verrier, based on studying disturbances in the orbit of Uranus, theoretically predicted the existence of Neptune and indicated where telescopes should be directed to see the new planet. When Le Verrier himself was asked to look through a telescope at the planet found at the “tip of a pen,” he refused: “It doesn’t interest me, I already know for sure that Neptune is exactly where it should be, judging by the calculations.”

This was, of course, unjustified self-confidence. No matter how accurate Le Verrier’s calculations were, the statement about the existence of Neptune remained, even if highly probable, until the observation of this planet, but only an assumption, and not a reliable fact. It could turn out that disturbances in the orb of Uranus are caused not by a still unknown planet, but by some other factors. This is exactly what turned out to be true when studying disturbances in the orbit of another planet - Mercury.

A person’s sensory experience – his sensations and perceptions – is a source of knowledge that connects him with the world. Justification by reference to experience gives confidence in the truth of such statements as “It’s hot,” “It’s dusk,” “This chrysanthemum is yellow,” etc.

It is not difficult, however, to notice that even in such simple statements there is no “pure” sensory intuition. For a person, it is always permeated with thinking; without concepts and without an admixture of reasoning, he is not able to express even his simplest observations, or record the most obvious facts.

We say, for example, “This house is blue” when we see the house in normal lighting and our feelings are not upset. But we will say, “This house appears blue,” if there is little light or we doubt our powers of observation. To perception, to sensory “data” we add a certain idea of ​​how objects appear under normal conditions and what these objects are like in other circumstances, in cases where our senses are capable of deceiving us. “Even our experience, obtained from experiments and observations,” writes the philosopher K. Popper, “does not consist of “data.” Rather, it consists of a web of guesses—assumptions, expectations, hypotheses, etc.—with which our accepted traditional scientific and non-scientific knowledge and prejudices are associated. There is simply no such thing as pure experience gained through experiment or observation.”

The “hardness” of sensory experience, of facts, is thus relative. There are often cases when facts that seem reliable at first have to be revised, clarified, or even completely discarded during their theoretical rethinking. Biologist K.A. Timiryazev drew attention to this. “Sometimes they say,” he wrote, “that a hypothesis must be in agreement with all known facts; it would be more correct to say - or to be able to detect the inconsistency of what is incorrectly recognized as facts and is in contradiction with it.”

It seems, for example, beyond doubt that if an opaque disk is placed between the screen and a point source of light, then a solid dark circle of shadow is formed on the screen, cast by this disk. In any case, at the beginning of the last century this seemed to be an obvious fact. French physicist O. Fresnel put forward the hypothesis that light is not a flow of particles, but the movement of waves. It followed from the hypothesis that there should be a small bright spot in the center of the shadow, since waves, unlike particles, are able to bend around the edges of the disk. There was a clear contradiction between hypothesis and fact. Subsequently, more carefully conducted experiments showed that a light spot actually forms in the center of the shadow. As a result, it was not Fresnel’s hypothesis that was rejected, but a seemingly obvious fact.

The situation is especially difficult with facts in the sciences about man and society. The problem is not only that some facts may turn out to be dubious, or even simply untenable. It also lies in the fact that the full meaning of a fact and its specific meaning can only be understood in a certain theoretical context, when considering the fact from some general point of view. This special dependence of the facts of the humanities on the theories within the framework of which they are established and interpreted has been emphasized more than once by the philosopher A.F. Losev. He, in particular, said that all so-called facts are always random, unexpected, fluid and unreliable, often incomprehensible; therefore, willy-nilly, one often has to deal not only with facts, but even more so with those generalities without which it is impossible to understand the facts themselves.

Direct confirmation is possible only in the case of statements about individual objects or limited collections of them. Theoretical propositions usually concern unlimited sets of things. The facts used in such confirmation are not always reliable and largely depend on general, theoretical considerations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the scope of direct observation is quite narrow.

There is a widespread belief that in substantiating and refuting statements, the main and decisive role is played by facts and direct observation of the objects under study. This belief, however, requires significant clarification. Bringing true and undeniable facts is a reliable and successful way of justification. Contrasting such facts with false or dubious statements is a good method of refutation. A real phenomenon, an event that does not agree with the consequences of some universal proposition, refutes not only these consequences, but also the proposition itself. Facts, as we know, are stubborn things. When confirming statements relating to a limited range of objects and refuting erroneous, speculative constructions divorced from reality, the “stubbornness of facts” manifests itself especially clearly.

And yet the facts, even in this narrow application, do not have absolute “hardness”. Even taken together, they do not constitute a completely reliable, unshakable foundation for the knowledge based on them. Facts mean a lot, but not everything.

As already indicated, the most important and at the same time universal method of confirmation is indirect confirmation – derivation of logical consequences from a justified position and their subsequent experimental verification.

Here is an already used example of indirect confirmation.

It is known that a very cool object in a warm room becomes covered with dew drops. If we see that a person’s glasses immediately fog up when they enter the house, we can conclude with reasonable certainty that it is frosty outside.

The importance of empirically substantiating claims cannot be overstated. It is due primarily to the fact that the only source of our knowledge is experience - in the sense that knowledge begins with living, sensory contemplation, with what is given in direct observation. Sensory experience connects a person with the world, theoretical knowledge is only a superstructure over the empirical basis.

At the same time, the theoretical cannot be completely reduced to the empirical. Experience is not an absolute and indisputable guarantor of the irrefutable knowledge. It can also be criticized, tested and revised. “In the empirical basis of objective science,” writes K. Popper, “there is nothing “absolute.” Science does not rest on a solid foundation of facts. The rigid structure of her theories rises, so to speak, above the swamp. It is like a building erected on stilts. These piles are driven into the swamp, but do not reach any natural or “given” foundation. If we stopped driving the piles further, it was not at all because we had reached solid ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are strong enough and capable, at least for a while, of supporting the weight of our structure.”

Thus, if we limit the range of ways to substantiate statements by their direct or indirect confirmation in experience, then it will turn out to be incomprehensible how it is still possible to move from hypotheses to theories, from assumptions to true knowledge.

Empirical data can be used during argumentation as examples, illustrations And samples.

An example is a fact or special case used as a starting point for a subsequent generalization and to reinforce the generalization made.

“Next I say,” wrote the 18th century philosopher. J. Berkeley - that sin or moral depravity does not consist in external physical action or movement, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. After all, killing an enemy in battle or carrying out a death sentence on a criminal, according to the law, is not considered sinful, although the external action here is the same as in the case of murder.” Two examples are given here (murder in war and in the execution of a death sentence) to support the general point about sin or moral depravity. The use of facts or particular cases as examples must be distinguished from the use of them as illustrations or sample. Acting as an example, a particular case makes a generalization possible; as an illustration, it reinforces an already established position; as a model, it encourages imitation.

An example can be used not only to support descriptive statements, but also as a starting point for descriptive generalizations. An example is not capable of supporting assessments and statements that, like norms, oaths, promises, recommendations, declarations, etc., tend to be assessments. An example cannot serve as source material for evaluative and similar statements. What is sometimes presented as an example, intended to somehow reinforce an assessment, norm, etc., is in fact not an example, but a model. The difference between an example and a sample is significant: an example is a description, while a sample is an assessment related to some particular case and establishing a particular standard, ideal, etc.

The purpose of the example is to lead to the formulation of a general position and, to some extent, to be an argument in support of the latter. Example selection criteria are associated with this purpose. First of all, the fact or particular case chosen as an example must appear clear and indisputable. It must also clearly express the tendency towards generalization. Connected with the requirement of tendentiousness, or typicality, of facts taken as an example is the recommendation to list several examples of the same type, if taken individually they do not suggest with the necessary certainty the direction of the upcoming generalization or do not reinforce the generalization already made. If the intention to argue with an example is not openly announced, the fact itself and its context should show that the listeners are dealing with an example, and not with a description of an isolated phenomenon, perceived as mere information. The event used as an example should be perceived, if not as ordinary, then at least as logically and physically possible. If this is not so, then the example simply interrupts the sequence of reasoning and leads to just the opposite result or a comic effect. An example should be selected and formed in such a way that it encourages a move from the individual or particular to the general, and not from the particular back to the particular.

It is sometimes suggested that an example should be given before the generalization it encourages and supports is stated. This opinion is hardly justified. The order of presentation is not particularly important for argumentation by example. It may precede the generalization, but it may also follow it. The function of an example is to push the thought towards a generalization and to support this generalization with a specific and typical example. If the emphasis is on giving thought movement and helping it, by inertia, come to a generalizing position, then an example usually precedes a generalization. If the reinforcing function of the example comes to the fore, then perhaps it is better to give it after the generalization. However, these two tasks facing the example are so closely related that their separation, and even more so their opposition, which is reflected in the sequence of presentation, is possible only in abstraction. Rather, here we can talk about another rule related to the complexity and surprise of the generalization that is made based on the example. If it is complex or simply unexpected for the audience, it is better to prepare its introduction with an example that precedes it. If the generalization is generally known to the listeners and does not sound like a paradox to them, then an example can follow its introduction into the presentation.

An illustration is a fact or a special case designed to strengthen the audience’s conviction in the correctness of an already known and accepted position. An example pushes thought to a new generalization and reinforces this generalization; an illustration clarifies a well-known general proposition, demonstrates its meaning through a number of possible applications, and enhances the effect of its presence in the minds of the audience. The difference in the tasks of the example and illustration is associated with the difference in the criteria for their selection. The example should look like a fairly “solid”, unambiguously interpreted fact. The illustration has the right to raise slight doubts, but at the same time it should have a particularly vivid impact on the imagination of the audience and attract their attention. An illustration, to a much lesser extent than an example, runs the risk of being misinterpreted, since it is based on an already known position. The distinction between an example and an illustration is not always clear-cut. Aristotle distinguished between two uses of example, depending on whether the speaker has any general principles or not: “... it is necessary to give many examples to the one who puts them at the beginning, and to the one who puts them at the end, one example is enough, for a witness who deserves faith is useful even when he is alone.”

The role of particular cases, according to Aristotle, is different depending on whether they precede the general situation to which they relate or follow it. The point, however, is that the facts given before the generalization are usually examples, while the one or few facts given after it are illustrative. This is also evidenced by Aristotle’s warning that the listener’s demands for an example are higher than for an illustration. An unsuccessful example casts doubt on the general point it is intended to reinforce. A contradictory example can even refute this position. The situation is different with an unsuccessful, inadequate illustration: the general position to which it is brought is not questioned, and an inadequate illustration is regarded rather as a negative characteristic of the one who applies it, indicating his lack of understanding of the general principle or his inability to choose a successful illustration. An inappropriate illustration can have a comic effect: “You must respect your parents. When one of them scolds you, immediately contradict him.” The ironic use of illustration is especially effective when describing a specific person: first, a positive characteristic is given to this person, and then an incompatible one is given. Thus, in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Antony, constantly reminding us that Brutus is an honest man, gives one after another evidence of his ingratitude and betrayal.

By specifying the general situation with the help of a particular case, the illustration enhances the effect of presence. On this basis, they sometimes see in it an image, a living picture of an abstract thought. The illustration does not, however, set itself the goal of replacing the abstract with the concrete and thereby transferring consideration to other objects. It does analogy, an illustration is nothing more than a special case that confirms an already known general position or facilitates a clearer understanding of it.

Often an illustration is chosen based on the emotional resonance it can evoke. This is what Aristotle does, for example, preferring a periodic style to a coherent style that does not have a clearly visible end: “... because everyone wants to see the end; For this reason, (those competing in running) become out of breath and become weak on turns, whereas before they did not feel tired, seeing the limit of running in front of them.”

A comparison used in argumentation, which is not a comparative evaluation (preference), is usually an illustration of one case by another, both cases being considered as instantiations of the same general principle. A typical example of comparison: “People are shown by circumstances. Therefore, when some circumstance befalls you, remember that it was God, like a gymnastics teacher, who pushed you to a rough end.”

All general provisions, scientific laws, principles, etc. cannot be justified purely empirically, by reference only to experience. They also require theoretical justification, based on reasoning and referring us to other accepted statements. Without this, there is neither abstract theoretical knowledge nor firm, well-founded beliefs.

One of the important ways to theoretically substantiate a statement is deducing it from some more general provisions. If the put forward assumption can be logically (deductively) deduced from some established truths, this means that it is true.

Let's say someone who is not familiar with the basics of the theory of electricity makes a guess that direct current is characterized not only by strength, but also by voltage. To confirm this guess, it is enough to open any reference book and find out that every current has a certain voltage. From this general proposition it follows that direct current also has voltage.

In L.N. Tolstoy’s story “The Death of Ivan Ilyich” there is an episode that is directly related to logic.

Ivan Ilyich felt that he was dying and was in constant despair. In a painful search for some kind of enlightenment, he even seized on his old thought that the rules of logic, always true and for everyone, were inapplicable to him. “That example of the syllogism that he learned in logic: Kai is a man, people are mortal, therefore Kai is mortal, seemed to him throughout his life to be correct only in relation to Kai, but not in any way to him. It was Kai - a man, a man in general, and this was completely fair; but he was not Kai or a person in general, but he was a completely, completely special creature from all the others... And Kai was definitely mortal, and it was right for him to die, but not for me, Vanya, Ivan Ilyich, with all my feelings, thoughts - it’s for me another thing. And it cannot be that I should die. It would be too terrible."

Ivan Ilyich’s train of thought was dictated, of course, by the despair that gripped him. Only it gave rise to the idea that what is always true for everyone will suddenly turn out to be inapplicable at a specific moment to a specific person. In a mind not gripped by horror, such a supposition cannot even arise. No matter how undesirable the consequences of our reasoning may be, they must be accepted if the initial premises are accepted.

Deductive reasoning is always a compulsion. When we think, we constantly feel pressure and lack of freedom. It is no coincidence that Aristotle, who was the first to emphasize the unconditionality of logical laws, noted with regret: “Thinking is suffering,” for “if a thing is necessary, it is a burden to us.”

By justifying a statement by deducing it from other accepted provisions, we do not make this statement absolutely reliable and irrefutable. But we fully transfer to it the degree of reliability that is inherent in the provisions accepted as premises of deduction. If, say, we are convinced that all people are mortal and that Ivan Ilyich, with all his peculiarities and uniqueness, is a man, we are also obliged to admit that he is mortal.

It may seem that deductive reasoning is, so to speak, the best of all possible methods of justification, since it imparts to the statement being justified the same firmness as the premises from which it is deduced. However, such an estimate would be clearly overestimated. The derivation of new propositions from established truths finds only limited application in the process of justification. The most interesting and important statements that need substantiation are, as a rule, general and cannot be obtained as consequences of existing truths. Statements that require substantiation usually speak of relatively new phenomena that have not been studied in detail and are not yet covered by universal principles.

A substantiated statement must be in agreement with the factual material on the basis of which and to explain which it is put forward. It must also comply with existing laws, principles, theories, etc. in the area under consideration.. This is the so-called compatibility condition.

If, for example, someone proposes a detailed design of a perpetual motion machine, then we will be primarily interested not in the subtleties of the design or its originality, but in whether its author is familiar with the law of conservation of energy. Energy, as is well known, does not arise from nothing and does not disappear without a trace; it only passes from one form to another. This means that a perpetual motion machine is incompatible with one of the fundamental laws of nature and, therefore, is impossible in principle, whatever its design.

While fundamentally important, the condition of compatibility does not mean, of course, that every new provision should be required to fully, passively adapt to what is today considered “the law.” Like correspondence with facts, correspondence with discovered theoretical truths should not be interpreted too straightforwardly. It may happen that new knowledge will force you to look differently at what was accepted before, clarify or even discard something from the old knowledge. Concordance with accepted theories is reasonable as long as it is aimed at finding the truth, and not at preserving the authority of an old theory.

If the condition of compatibility is understood absolutely, then it excludes the possibility of intensive development of science. Science is given the opportunity to develop by extending already discovered laws to new phenomena, but it is deprived of the right to revise already formulated provisions. But this is tantamount to actually denying the development of science.

The new position must be in agreement not only with well-established theories, but also with certain general principles that have developed in the practice of scientific research. These principles are heterogeneous, they have varying degrees of generality and specificity; compliance with them is desirable, but not necessary.

The most famous of them is principle of simplicity. It requires using as few independent assumptions as possible when explaining the phenomena being studied, and the latter should be as simple as possible. The principle of simplicity runs through the entire history of natural sciences. Many prominent naturalists indicated that he repeatedly played a leading role in their research. In particular, I. Newton put forward a special requirement “not to be excessive” in reasons when explaining phenomena.

However, the concept of simplicity is not unambiguous. We can talk about the simplicity of the assumptions underlying the theoretical generalization and the independence of such assumptions from each other. But simplicity can also be understood as ease of manipulation, ease of learning, etc. It is also not obvious that the desire to make do with a smaller number of premises, taken in itself, increases the reliability of the conclusion drawn from them.

“It would seem reasonable to look for the simplest solution,” writes logician and philosopher W. Quine. “But this supposed quality of simplicity is much easier to feel than to describe.” And yet, he continues, “the existing norms of simplicity, however difficult they may be to formulate, are playing an increasingly important role. It is the responsibility of the scientist to generalize and extrapolate exemplary data and, consequently, to comprehend laws that cover more phenomena than have been taken into account; and simplicity in its understanding is precisely what serves as the basis for extrapolation. Simplicity refers to the essence of statistical inference. If a scientist's data is represented as points on a graph, and the law must be represented as a curve passing through those points, then he draws the smoothest, simplest curve he can. He even manipulates the points a little to make the task easier, justifying the inaccuracy of the measurements. If he can get a simpler curve by omitting some points altogether, he tries to explain them in a special way... Whatever simplicity is, it is not just a fad.”

Another general principle often used when evaluating assumptions is the so-called familiarity principle. He recommends avoiding unjustified innovations and trying, as far as possible, to explain new phenomena using known laws. “The usefulness of the principle of familiarity for the continuous activity of the creative imagination,” writes W. Quine, “is a kind of paradox. Conservatism, the preference of an inherited or developed conceptual scheme over one's own accomplished work, is both a defensive reaction of laziness and a strategy of discovery." If, however, simplicity and conservatism give opposing recommendations, simplicity should be preferred.

The picture of the world developed by science is not uniquely predetermined by the objects being studied themselves. In these conditions of incomplete certainty, the action of various general recommendations unfolds, helping to choose one of several competing ideas about the world.

Another way of theoretical justification is analysis of a statement from the point of view of the possibility of its empirical confirmation and refutation.

Scientific propositions are required to allow the fundamental possibility of refutation and require certain procedures for their confirmation. If this is not the case, it is impossible to say regarding the proposition put forward which situations and facts are incompatible with it and which support it. The position, which in principle does not allow refutation and confirmation, is beyond constructive criticism; it does not outline any real ways for further research. A statement that is not comparable either with experience or with existing knowledge cannot, of course, be considered justified.

If someone predicts that tomorrow it will rain or it will not rain, then this assumption is fundamentally impossible to refute. It will be true both if it rains the next day and if it doesn’t. At any time, regardless of the weather condition, it is either raining or not. It will never be possible to refute this kind of “weather forecast”. It cannot be confirmed either.

The assumption that exactly ten years later in the same place will be sunny and dry can hardly be called justified. It is not based on any facts; it is impossible to even imagine how it could be refuted or confirmed, if not now, then at least in the near future.

At the beginning of this century, biologist G. Drish tried to introduce a certain hypothetical “life force”, inherent only in living beings and forcing them to behave the way they behave. This force – Drish called it “entelechy” – supposedly has different types, depending on the stage of development of organisms. In the simplest single-celled organisms, entelechy is relatively simple. In humans, it is much larger than the mind, because it is responsible for everything that every cell does in the body. Drish did not determine how the entelechy of, say, an oak differs from the entelechy of a goat or a giraffe. He simply said that every organism has its own entelechy. He interpreted the usual laws of biology as manifestations of entelechy. If you cut off a sea urchin's limb in a certain way, the urchin will not survive. If you cut it off in another way, the hedgehog will survive, but only an incomplete limb will grow back. If the incision is made differently and at a certain stage of the sea urchin’s growth, the limb will be completely restored. Drish interpreted all these dependencies, known to zoologists, as evidence of the action of entelechy.

Was it possible to test experimentally the existence of a mysterious “life force”? No, because she did not show herself as anything other than what was known and explainable without her. It added nothing to the scientific explanation, and no specific facts could affect it. The entelechy hypothesis, which had no fundamental possibility of empirical confirmation, was soon abandoned as useless.

Another example of a fundamentally unverifiable statement is the assumption of the existence of supernatural, intangible objects that do not manifest themselves in any way and do not reveal themselves in any way.

Propositions that, in principle, do not allow verification, must, of course, be distinguished from statements that are unverifiable only today, at the current level of development of science. A little over a hundred years ago, it seemed obvious that we would never know the chemical composition of distant celestial bodies. Various hypotheses on this score seemed fundamentally untestable. But after the creation of spectroscopy, they became not only testable, but also ceased to be hypotheses, turning into experimentally established facts.

Statements that cannot be verified immediately are not discarded if, in principle, it remains possible to verify them in the future. But usually such statements do not become the subject of serious scientific debate.

This is the case, for example, with the assumption of the existence of extraterrestrial civilizations, the practical possibility of verifying which is so far negligible.

Methods of theoretical justification also include checking the proposed position for its applicability to a wide class of objects under study. If a statement that is true for one area turns out to be sufficiently universal and leads to new conclusions not only in the original area, but also in related areas, its objective significance increases markedly. The tendency to expansion, to expand the scope of its applicability is, to a greater or lesser extent, inherent in all fruitful scientific generalizations.

A good example here is the quantum hypothesis put forward by M. Planck. At the end of the last century, physicists were faced with the problem of radiation from the so-called absolutely black body, i.e. a body that absorbs all radiation incident on it and does not reflect anything. To avoid infinite amounts of emitted energy that have no physical meaning, Planck suggested that energy is not emitted continuously, but in separate discrete portions - quanta. At first glance, the hypothesis seemed to explain one relatively particular phenomenon - black body radiation. But if this were really so, then the quantum hypothesis would hardly have survived in science. In fact, the introduction of quanta proved to be extraordinarily fruitful and quickly spread to a number of other fields. A. Einstein developed the theory of the photoelectric effect based on the idea of ​​quanta, N. Bohr developed the theory of the hydrogen atom. In a short time, the quantum hypothesis explained from one basis an extremely wide field of very different phenomena.

Expanding the scope of the statement, its ability to explain and predict completely new facts is an undoubted and important argument in its support. Confirmation of a scientific position by facts and experimental laws, the existence of which before its advancement could not even be assumed, directly indicates that this position captures the deep internal relationship of the phenomena being studied.

It is difficult to name a statement that would be justified on its own, in isolation from other statements. Justification is always systemic character. The inclusion of a new provision in a system of other provisions, which imparts stability to its elements, is one of the most important steps in its justification.

Confirmation of the consequences arising from the theory is at the same time a reinforcement of the theory itself. On the other hand, a theory imparts certain impulses and strength to the propositions put forward on its basis and thereby contributes to their justification. A statement that has become part of a theory is based not only on individual facts, but in many ways also on a wide range of phenomena explained by the theory, on its prediction of new, previously unknown effects, on its connections with other scientific theories, etc. By including the analyzed position in the theory, we thereby extend to it the empirical and theoretical support that the theory as a whole has.

This point has been noted more than once by philosophers and scientists who have thought about the justification of knowledge.

Thus, the philosopher L. Wittgenstein wrote about the integrity and systematic nature of knowledge: “It is not an isolated axiom that strikes me as obvious, but a whole system in which consequences and premises mutually support each other.” Systematicity extends not only to theoretical positions, but also to experimental data: “We can say that experience teaches us some statements. However, he teaches us not isolated statements, but a whole set of interdependent sentences. If they were separate, I might doubt them, because I don’t have direct experience with each of them.” The foundations of a system of propositions, Wittgenstein notes, do not support this system, but are themselves supported by it. This means that the reliability of the foundations is determined not by them in themselves, but by the fact that an integral theoretical system can be built on top of them. The “foundation” of knowledge appears to be hanging in the air until a stable building is built on it. The statements of a scientific theory are mutually intertwined and support each other. They hold on like people on a crowded bus, when they are supported on all sides, and they do not fall because there is nowhere to fall.

Because a theory provides additional support for its propositions, improving the theory, strengthening its empirical base and clarifying its general, including philosophical premises, is at the same time a contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it.

Among the ways to clarify a theory, a special role is played by identifying the logical connections of its statements, minimizing its initial assumptions, constructing it in the form of an axiomatic system and, finally, if possible, its formalization.

At axiomatization theory, some of its provisions are chosen as initial ones, and all other provisions are derived from them in a purely logical way. Initial propositions accepted without proof are called axioms(postulates), the provisions proven on their basis - theorems.

The axiomatic method of systematizing and clarifying knowledge originated in antiquity and gained great popularity thanks to Euclid’s “Elements” - the first axiomatic interpretation of geometry. Now axiomatization is used in mathematics, logic, as well as in certain branches of physics, biology, etc. The axiomatic method requires a high level of development of the axiomatized substantive theory and clear logical connections of its statements. This is due to its rather narrow applicability and the naivety of attempts to rebuild any science according to the model of Euclid’s geometry.

In addition, as the logician and mathematician K. Gödel showed, fairly rich scientific theories (for example, the arithmetic of natural numbers) do not allow complete axiomatization. This indicates the limitations of the axiomatic method and the impossibility of complete formalization of scientific knowledge.

Methodological argumentation is the substantiation of a separate statement or an entire concept by referring to the undoubtedly reliable method by which the substantiated statement or defended concept was obtained.

Ideas about the scope of methodological argumentation changed from one era to another. Significant importance was attached to it in modern times, when it was believed that it was the methodological guarantee, and not compliance with the facts as such, that imparted validity to a judgment. Modern scientific methodology is skeptical about the idea that strict adherence to a method can in itself provide the truth and serve as a reliable justification for it. The possibilities of methodological argumentation vary in different fields of knowledge. References to the method by which a specific conclusion was obtained are common in the natural sciences, but extremely rare in the humanities and almost never found in practical and especially artistic thinking.

Methodology, the essence of which is the exaggeration of the importance of methodological argumentation and even giving it priority over other methods of theoretical argumentation, is fraught with the danger of relativizing scientific and other knowledge. If the content of knowledge is determined not by a reality independent of it, but by what we should or want to see in it, and truth is determined by compliance with methodological canons, then the ground of objectivity slips away from knowledge. No surrogates, such as intersubjectivity, generally accepted method, its success, etc., are capable of replacing the truth and providing a sufficiently strong foundation for the acceptance of knowledge. Methodology reduces scientific thinking to a system of established, mostly technical methods of finding new knowledge. The result is that scientific thinking is arbitrarily reduced to the set of technical techniques it invents. According to the principle empiricism, only observations or experiments play a decisive role in science in the process of accepting or rejecting scientific statements. In accordance with this principle, methodological argumentation can only be of secondary importance and can never put an end to the dispute about the fate of a particular scientific statement or theory. A general methodological principle of empiricism states that the various rules of scientific method should not allow for a “dictatorial strategy.” They must exclude the possibility that we will always win a game played according to these rules: nature must be capable of defeating us at least sometimes.

Methodological rules are vague and unstable, they always have exceptions. In particular, induction, which plays a special role in scientific reasoning, has no clear rules at all. The scientific method undoubtedly exists, but it does not represent an exhaustive list of rules and patterns that are mandatory for every researcher. Even the most obvious of these rules can be interpreted in different ways. The “rules of the scientific method” change from one field of knowledge to another, since the essential content of these “rules” is uncodifiable skill, i.e. ability to conduct specific research and make generalizations.

The scientific method does not contain rules that have no or in principle do not allow exceptions. All its rules are conditional and can be violated even if their conditions are met. Any rule can be useful in scientific research, just as any method of argumentation can have an impact on the beliefs of the scientific community. But it does not follow from this that all research methods and methods of argumentation actually used in science are equivalent and it does not matter in what sequence they are used. In this respect, a “methodological code” is quite similar to a moral code.

Methodological argumentation is thus completely legitimate, and in science, when the core of methodological requirements is stable, it is necessary. However, methodological arguments do not have decisive power even in science. First of all, the methodology of humanitarian knowledge is not so clear that it can be referred to. It is sometimes even argued that the mental sciences use a completely different methodology than the natural sciences. It is generally difficult to say anything concrete about the methodology of practical and artistic thinking. Further, the methodological ideas of scientists are, at each specific period of time, the result and conclusion of the previous history of scientific knowledge. The methodology of science, formulating its requirements, is based on the history of science. To insist on the unconditional fulfillment of these requirements would mean to elevate a certain historical state of science to an eternal and absolute standard. Each new study is not only an application of already known methodological rules, but also a test of them. The researcher may obey the old methodological rule, but may also find it unacceptable in some particular new case. The history of science includes both cases in which proven rules led to success, and cases in which success resulted from the rejection of some established methodological standard. Scientists not only submit to methodological requirements, but also criticize them and create both new theories and new methodologies.

Contextual argumentation is argumentation whose effectiveness is limited to certain audiences.

Contextual methods of argumentation include arguments to tradition and authority, to intuition and faith, to common sense and taste, etc. Contextual argumentation is opposed to universal argument, applicable, in principle, to any audience. The line between contextual and universal argumentation is relative. Methods of argumentation that are supposed to be universally applicable, such as proof, may not be effective for a particular audience. Conversely, some contextual arguments, like arguments from tradition or intuition, may seem persuasive to almost any audience. It would be a mistake to characterize contextual argumentation as non-rational or even irrational. The distinction between “rational” and “irrational” based on methods of argumentation is not justified. It sharply narrows the sphere of the rational, excluding from it most of the humanitarian and practical reasoning, unthinkable without the use of “classics” (authorities), continuation of tradition, appeal to common sense and taste, etc. Understanding the finitude that dominates human existence and historical consciousness presupposes the acceptance of conceptual argumentation as a necessary component of rational argumentation.

Of the contextual methods of argumentation, the most common and most significant is argument to tradition. In essence, all other contextual arguments contain a collapsed reference to tradition; The audience's perception of the arguments presented is also largely determined by the traditions that it shares. This influence of tradition on the effectiveness of argumentation is due to the fact that it reinforces those most general assumptions that must be believed in order for the argument to seem plausible, and creates that preliminary installation, without which it loses its strength.

Tradition is an anonymous, spontaneously formed system of patterns, norms, rules, etc., which guides the behavior of a fairly large and stable group of people.

The broadest traditions, covering the entire society at a certain period of its development, are, as a rule, not recognized as such by those who follow them. This is especially evident in the so-called “traditional society”, where traditions determine all any significant aspects of social life. Traditions have a clearly expressed dual, descriptive-evaluative character. On the one hand, they accumulate previous experience of successful activity; they turn out to be a unique expression of it. On the other hand, they represent a blueprint and prescription for future behavior. Tradition is what makes a person a link in the chain of generations, which expresses his presence in historical time, his presence in the “present” as a link connecting the past and the future. Tradition gains its recognition by relying primarily on knowledge and does not require blind obedience. It is also not something like a natural given, limiting freedom of action and not allowing critical discussion; tradition is the intersection of human freedom and human history. The contrast between tradition and reason must take into account that reason is not some primordial factor designed to play the role of an impartial and infallible judge. Reason develops historically and rationality can be considered as one of the traditions.

The argument to tradition is inevitable in all those discussions, including scientific ones, which include the “present” as a topic of discussion or as one of the factors determining the position of the researcher.

The argument is close to tradition argument to authority - a reference to the opinion or action of a person who has proven himself well in a given area by his judgments or actions.

An argument to authority is necessary, although not sufficient, in the case of justifying instructions (commands, directives, state laws, etc.). It is also important when discussing the value of advice, wishes, methodological and other recommendations. This argument must be taken into account when assessing warnings, requests, promises, threats, etc. The role of authority and, accordingly, appeals to it in almost all practical matters is undoubted.

A distinction needs to be made between epistemic authority, or the authority of an expert, a specialist in some field, and deontic authority, the authority of a superior person or body. The argument to authority advanced in support of a descriptive statement is an appeal to epistemic authority; the same argument, but supporting an evaluative statement, is an appeal to deontic authority. The latter is divided into authority sanctions and authority solidarity. The order of the first is carried out under threat of punishment, the instructions of the second are carried out because it contributes to the achievement of the common goal. For example, behind the laws of the state there is the authority of sanctions; behind the orders of the captain of the ship in a moment of danger is the authority of solidarity. The division of authorities into authorities of sanctions and authorities of solidarity is not rigid. Let's say that the laws of a state pursue certain goals that may be shared by the citizens of the state; The captain's orders addressed to the sailors of a sinking ship are based not only on the authority of solidarity, but also on the authority of sanction.

An argument to authority is only rarely considered a sufficient reason for the acceptance of a statement. It is usually accompanied by other, explicit or implied, arguments. Norms, unlike other assessments, always require an indication of the authority to which they belong. The first question that arises when discussing a norm is the question of whether there is some kind of authority behind it and whether it has the power to oblige, permit or prohibit. If the authority is absent or does not have sufficient powers, there is no possible punishment for non-compliance with the norm, and therefore there is no norm itself.

Of the many erroneous judgments associated with the argument to authority, two can be distinguished: a sharp contrast between authority and reason; confusion of deontic authority with epistemic authority. Authority and reason do not contradict each other; listening to authority most often means behaving quite prudently. If, for example, a mother tells a child that there is a big city, Moscow, the child acts reasonably, considering this to be true. The pilot acts just as wisely when he believes the meteorologist's reports. Even in science we resort to authorities, as evidenced, in particular, by the extensive libraries available in every scientific institute.

As you know, the essence of dogmatism is the desire to always move from established doctrine to reality, to practice, and in no case in the opposite direction. A dogmatist is unable to notice the discrepancy between an idea and changed circumstances. He does not even stop to dissect the latter so that they turn out - or at least seem - to correspond to the idea.

The generation and continuation of dogmatism is authoritarian thinking. It strengthens and concretizes dogmatism by combining quotes, statements, sayings belonging to recognized authorities. At the same time, the latter are canonized, turned into idols, incapable of making mistakes and guaranteeing those who follow them against mistakes.

Unpremised thinking, relying only on itself, does not exist. Any thinking proceeds from certain, explicit or implicit, analyzed or accepted without analysis premises, for it is always based on past experience and its understanding. But the presupposition of theoretical thinking and its authoritarianism are not identical. Authoritarianism is a special, extreme, so to speak, degenerate case of presupposition, when they try to shift the function of research and reflection itself almost completely to authority.

Authoritarian thinking, even before beginning to study specific problems, limits itself to a certain set of “fundamental” statements, to that model that determines the main line of research and largely determines its result. The original sample is not subject to any doubt and no modification, at least in its core. It is supposed to contain in germ the solution to every problem that arises, or at least the key to such a solution. The system of ideas taken as a model is considered internally consistent. If there are several samples, they are considered to be quite consistent with each other.

A reference to authority, to what someone has said or written is not a universal method of justification. Of course, authorities are needed, including in the theoretical sphere. The capabilities of an individual are limited; not everything is able to be independently analyzed and verified. In many ways, he is forced to rely on the opinions and judgments of others.

But one should rely not because it was said by “so-and-so,” but because what was said seems correct. Blind faith in the always correctness of authority, and even more so superstitious admiration for it, is poorly compatible with the search for truth, goodness and beauty, which requires an unbiased, critical mind. As B. Pascal said, “nothing is more in agreement with reason than its distrust of itself.”

Authoritarian thinking is condemned by almost everyone. Nevertheless, such “blindfolded thinking” is far from uncommon. There are several reasons for this. One of them has already been mentioned: a person is not able not only to live, but also to think alone. He remains a “social being” in the sphere of thinking: the reasoning of each individual is based on the discoveries and experiences of other people. It is often difficult to grasp the line where critical, balanced perception turns into unjustified trust in what is written and said by others.

American entrepreneur and industrial organizer Henry Ford once remarked: “For most people, the punishment is having to think.” This is unlikely to be true for the majority, but there are definitely people who are more inclined to rely on someone else’s opinion than to look for an independent solution. It is much easier to go with the flow than to try to row against it.

A certain Dauphin of France could not understand from the explanations of his teacher why the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. Finally the teacher exclaimed: “I swear to you, Your Highness, that she is equal to them!” “Why didn’t you immediately explain it to me so convincingly?” - asked the Dauphin.

“We are all lazy and incurious,” said the poet, probably meaning the frequent reluctance to think for ourselves. The case of the Dauphin, who trusts more in an oath than in geometric proof, is a concentrated expression of “laziness and lack of curiosity,” which sometimes inclines to passively following authority.

One day, the Norwegian police, concerned about the spread of home-made medicines, placed an advertisement in the newspaper about the inadmissibility of using a medicine with the following advertisement: “New medicine Lurism-300x: saves from baldness, cures all chronic diseases, saves gasoline, makes fabric bulletproof. The price is only 15 crowns.” The promises made by these advertisements are absurd, and the word “lurism” in local slang meant “half-wit.” And yet, the newspaper that published the ad received three hundred requests for this medicine in the coming days, along with the required amount.

A certain role in such an unexpected turn of events was played not only by faith and hope for a miracle, characteristic even of modern man, but also by the excessive trust in the authority of the printed word, characteristic of many. Once it’s printed, it means it’s true—this is one of the prerequisites of authoritarian thinking. But one only has to imagine how many different kinds of fables and absurdities appear in the press, so as not to look at what is printed uncritically.

Authorities are needed, including in the theoretical sphere. But one should rely on their opinions not because it was said by “so-and-so,” but because what was said seems correct. Blind faith in the always correctness of authority, and even more so superstitious admiration for it, are poorly compatible with the search for truth and goodness, which requires an unbiased, critical mind. Authority belongs to a certain human personality, but the authority of a person has as its final basis not submission and renunciation of reason, but the awareness that this person surpasses us in intelligence and sharpness of judgment. Recognizing someone as an authority is always associated with the assumption that his judgments are not unreasonably arbitrary, but are accessible to understanding and critical analysis.

Intuitive argumentation is a reference to the immediate, intuitive evidence of the proposition being put forward.

The role of intuition and, accordingly, intuitive argumentation in mathematics and logic is very important. Intuition is of essential importance in moral life, in historical and in general in humanitarian knowledge. Artistic thinking is generally unthinkable without intuition. However, intuitive argumentation in its pure form is rare. Usually, for a result found intuitively, reasons are looked for in hindsight that seem more convincing than a reference to its intuitive obviousness. Intuition is never final and its result is subject to critical analysis. Even in mathematics, intuition is not always clear: statements like 2+2=4 have the highest level of evidence, but 1002+2=1004 has a lower level of evidence and is proven not by actual calculation, but by reasoning. Intuition can simply be deceiving. Throughout most of the 19th century. mathematicians were intuitively convinced that any continuous function has a derivative, but Weierstrass proved the existence of a continuous function that does not have a derivative at any point. Mathematical reasoning corrected intuition and supplemented it. Intuition changes over time and is largely a product of cultural development and advances in discursive thinking. Einstein's intuition about space and time was clearly different from the corresponding intuition of Newton or Kant. The intuition of a specialist, as a rule, exceeds the intuition of an amateur.

Intuition is close faith- a deep, sincere, emotionally charged conviction in the justice of some position or concept. If intuition is a direct perception of truth and goodness, then faith is a direct attraction to what appears to be truth or goodness. Like intuition, faith is subjective and varies from person to person. In different eras, the subject of sincere faith was diametrically opposed views. What was once sacredly believed by everyone, after a time seemed to the majority to be a naive prejudice. Depending on the way in which faith is justified, there are rational And irrational faith. The latter serves as an excuse for itself. The very fact of faith is considered sufficient to justify it. A reference to firm belief, a strong conviction in the correctness of a proposition, can be used as an argument in favor of accepting that proposition. However argument To faith seems convincing and weighty, as a rule, only to those who share this belief or are inclined to accept it. To others, the argument for faith may seem subjective and almost empty: you can believe in the most ridiculous statements. Nevertheless, there are situations when the argument for faith turns out to be almost the only one - situations of radical dissent, irreconcilable “dissent.” It is impossible to convert a dissident with reasonable arguments. In this case, all that remains is to hold tightly to your faith and declare opposing views heretical, insane, etc. Where reasoning and argument are powerless, the expression of firm, persistent conviction can play some role over time. The argument for faith only rarely appears explicitly. Usually it is implied, and only the weakness or vagueness of the arguments presented directly indirectly shows that behind them there is an implicit appeal to faith.

Common sense can be described as the general sense of truth and justice inherent in every person, given by the experience of life.

At its core, common sense is not knowledge. Rather, it is a way of selecting knowledge, that general illumination, thanks to which the main and the secondary are distinguished in knowledge and the extremes are outlined. An argument for common sense, one of the most commonly used in contextual argumentation. Modern philosophical hermeneutics attaches significant importance to this argument, opposing its intellectualization and reducing it to the level of a simple amendment: that which in feelings, judgments and conclusions contradicts common sense cannot be correct. We will apply common sense primarily in social, practical matters. He judges not by the general precepts of reason, but rather by convincing examples. History and life experience are decisive for him. Common sense cannot be learned, it can only be practiced. An appeal to common sense is inevitable in the humanities, which are woven into the historical tradition and are not only its understanding, but also its continuation. Appeal to common sense is quite rare and unreliable in the natural sciences, which strive to abstract from their history and put it outside the brackets.

An argument to taste is an appeal to the sense of taste that the audience has and can persuade it to accept the position put forward.

Taste concerns only the perfection of some things and is based on direct feeling, and not on reasoning. I. Kant characterized taste as “the sensory definition of perfection.” The concept of taste was originally moral and only later its use was narrowed to the aesthetic sphere of “beautiful spirituality.” Good taste is not entirely subjective, but involves the ability to maintain distance from oneself and group preferences. You can give preference to something, despite the fact that at the same time it is not accepted by your own taste. The principle “There is no dispute about taste” is not true in its general formulation. Disputes about taste are quite common; aesthetics and art criticism consist primarily of such disputes. You can argue about tastes, but only with the intention of achieving not truth, but victory, i.e. approval of their assessment system, and arguing is not only incorrect and sophistical, but also completely correct. Argument to fashion is a special case of the argument from taste. Taste bears the imprint of the community of social life and changes along with its changes. Judgments of taste belonging to different eras or to different societies usually turn out to be incompatible with each other.

Examples from the history of science show that justification is not only a complex, but also a multi-stage procedure. A substantiated statement, included in the theory as its constituent element, ceases to be problematic knowledge. But this does not mean that it becomes the absolute truth, the ultimate truth, incapable of further development and clarification.

The substantiation of the statement makes it not an absolute, but only a relative truth that correctly captures the mechanism of the phenomena under study at a given level of knowledge. In the process of further deepening knowledge, such a truth can and will certainly be overcome. But its main content, subject to limitation and clarification, will retain its meaning.

The complexity of the procedure for substantiating theoretical statements inclines some philosophers and scientists to the opinion that this procedure never leads to any solid result and all our knowledge is, by its very nature, conditional and hypothetical. It begins with an assumption and remains an assumption forever, since there is no path leading from a plausible assumption to an undoubted truth.

The philosopher B. Russell wrote that “all human knowledge is unreliable, inaccurate and partial.” “Not only can science not reveal to us the nature of things,” argued A. Poincaré, “nothing can reveal it to us.” K. Popper has long defended the idea that such a thing as confirmation of hypotheses is generally a fiction. It is only possible to refute them on the basis of establishing the falsity of the consequences arising from them. What we are accustomed to consider as reliable knowledge is, according to Popper, only a set of assumptions that for the time being can withstand attempts to refute them.

An even more radical position is taken by the philosopher P. Feyerabend, who argues that the so-called “scientific method,” which has always been considered the most effective means of obtaining new knowledge and its substantiation, is nothing more than a fiction: “Science does not stand out in a positive way for its method, because such a method does not exist; Nor does it stand out for its results: we know what science has achieved, but we have no idea what other traditions could achieve.” Feyerabend is inclined to explain the authority of science by circumstances external to it: “...Today science dominates not because of its comparative merits, but thanks to propaganda and advertising campaigns organized for it.” In the vein of this “debunking” of the scientific method and its result - objective scientific knowledge, comes Feyerabend’s general conclusion: “...Science is much closer to myth than the philosophy of science is ready to admit. It is one of many forms of thinking that humans have developed, and not necessarily the best. It blinds only those who have already decided in favor of a certain ideology or do not think at all about the advantages and limitations of science. Since the acceptance or non-acceptance of this or that ideology should be left to the individual himself, it follows that the separation of the state from the church should be complemented by the separation of the state from science - this most aggressive and most dogmatic religious institution. Such separation is our only chance to achieve that humanism of which we are capable, but which we have never achieved.”

If science does not provide objective, substantiated knowledge and is so close to myth and religion that it must, like them, be separated from the state and, in particular, from the learning process, then the very formulation of the problem of substantiating knowledge becomes meaningless. Fact and word of authority, scientific law and faith or tradition, scientific method and intuitive insight become completely equal. This erases the distinction between truth, which requires a reliable foundation, and subjective opinion, which is often not based on any reasonable arguments.

Thus, the complexity and ambiguity of the process of justification inclines one to the idea that all knowledge is a hypothesis, and even inspires the idea that science differs little from religion.

Indeed, the search for absolute reliability and certainty is doomed to failure, whether we are talking about chemistry, history or mathematics. Scientific theories are always speculative to one degree or another. They do not give absolute, but only relative truth.

But this is the truth, and not a guess or a risky assumption. The practical results of the application of scientific knowledge to transform the world, to achieve human goals, clearly indicate that the theories of science have objectively true and, therefore, irrefutable content.

Speaking about methods of justification that differ in their effectiveness, and in particular about scientific justification, it should be remembered that science, for all its importance, is neither the only nor even the central sphere of human activity. Scientific knowledge is primarily only a means for society to solve its diverse problems. To reduce all forms of human activity to such knowledge or to build them on its model is not only naive, but also dangerous. The result of such a reduction would be “marriage as an exact science,” “playing cards in a scientific way,” raising children in a scientific way, love “according to science,” and even charity based on a scientific basis.

Previously, we talked about methods of justification used in science and those areas of life in which consistent, demonstrative reasoning plays a central role. But even a system of scientific knowledge cannot be established solely by arguments. An attempt to substantiate any scientific position “to the end” would lead to a regression to infinity. The foundation of the rationale lies mode of action, specific practice.

It is unjustified to extend the methods of justification characteristic of science to other areas that may have little in common with it and convince by completely different means.

In a work of art there is no need to specifically prove; on the contrary, one must renounce the desire to build chains of reasoning, identifying the consequences of accepted premises.

“The power of reason,” wrote B. Pascal, “is that it recognizes the existence of many phenomena that are incomprehensible to it; he is weak if he is not able to understand this.” By “reason” we mean, of course, the argumentative, substantiating reason that finds its most perfect embodiment in science.

The esthetician J. Joubert notes about Aristotle: “He was wrong in his desire to make everything in his books scientific, that is, provable, reasoned, irrefutable; he did not take into account that there are truths accessible only to the imagination, and that, perhaps, these truths are the most beautiful.” And if this is true of Aristotle, who was primarily concerned with logic and philosophy, then those who, “verifying harmony with algebra,” want to rebuild ideology, morality, artistic criticism, etc., according to a strict scientific model, are all the more wrong.

Rational methods of justification are an indispensable tool of the human mind. But the scope of their application is not limitless. Expanding it beyond measure is just as unjustified as immoderate narrowing.

Justification of assessments is the presentation of reasons (arguments) in support of the expressed assessments with the intention of convincing the audience of their acceptability.

For example, in support of the assessment “It is good when a soldier is disciplined” one can refer to the statement “An army consisting of undisciplined soldiers is sure to fail”; assessment " N must be honest" can be justified by citing the fact that it follows from the premises " N. - a person" and "Every person should be honest."

Methods of argumentation are divided to universal, applicable to all audiences, and contextual, successful only in some audiences. Universal argumentation is further divided into empirical, including a reference to what is given in experience, and theoretical based mainly on reasoning. This classification of methods of justification in relation to evaluative statements requires an important clarification: the empirical justification of assessments has a different meaning than the justification of descriptive statements. Estimates cannot be supported by reference to what is given in direct experience. At the same time, there are methods of substantiating estimates that are in a certain respect similar to methods of substantiating descriptions and which can therefore be called quasi-empirical. These include various inductive reasoning, among the premises of which there are estimates and the conclusion of which is also an estimate. This incomplete induction, analogy, link to sample, target rationale(confirmation), interpretation of the act of understanding as inductive evidence in favor of its premises, etc.

Values ​​are not given to a person in experience. They're not talking about what There is in the world, but about what must in him be, and they cannot be seen, heard, etc. Knowledge about values ​​cannot be empirical; the procedures for obtaining it can only superficially resemble the procedures for obtaining empirical knowledge.

The simplest and at the same time the most unreliable way to inductively substantiate estimates is incomplete(popular) induction. Its general scheme:

Here are the first n the premises are evaluations, the last premise is a descriptive statement; the conclusion is an assessment. For example:

Suvorov had to be persistent and courageous.

Napoleon had to be steadfast and courageous.

Eisenhower had to be steadfast and courageous.

Suvorov, Napoleon and Eisenhower were commanders.

Every commander must be steadfast and courageous

A popular way of inductively arguing to support estimates is by analogy. General scheme of the evaluative analogy:

Item A has signs of a, b, s and is positively (negatively, neutrally) valuable.

Item B has signs a, b, c

Item B is also likely to be positively (negatively, neutrally) valuable.

In this reasoning, the similarity of two objects in some characteristics is continued and, based on the fact that the first object has a certain value, it is concluded that the second object has the same value.

For example: "Book A– a dystopia written in good language and with an entertaining plot deserves praise; book B is also a dystopia, written in good language and with an entertaining plot; it means a book B also seems to deserve praise."

Often the analogy with an evaluative premise appears in the form: “The subject A has properties a,b,c and there should be d; item B has properties a,b,c; means the subject B should probably be d».

For example: “A good car has wheels, an engine and should be economical; a good tractor has wheels and a motor; This means that a good tractor should also, apparently, be economical.” Only in the rarest cases does evaluative analogy appear in such a transparent form as in the examples given. “Man, compared to the deity, is as childish,” said Heraclitus, “as a child compared to man.” In this condensed analogy we are talking about the fact that a person, in comparison with a higher stage of development (which is a deity), should seem childish, since a child, being in many ways similar to an adult person (and having him at a higher stage of his development), should seem childish.

Cervantes' Don Quixote makes this clear analogy: "A knight errant without a lady is like a tree without leaves, a building without a foundation, or a shadow without a body to cast it." Since a tree without leaves, a building without a foundation and a shadow without a body inspire suspicion and cannot be assessed positively, a knight errant without a lady evokes the same reaction.

Another way to inductively substantiate estimates is appeal to sample.

A pattern is the behavior of a person or group of people that is to be followed.. The sample is fundamentally different from example: the example suggests that There is in reality and is used to support descriptive statements, the pattern suggests that there must be and is used to support general evaluative statements. Due to its special social prestige, the model not only supports the assessment, but also serves as a guarantee of the chosen type of behavior: following a generally recognized model guarantees a high assessment of behavior in the eyes of society.

The model plays an exceptional role in social life, in the formation and strengthening of social values. A person, a society, an era are largely characterized by the patterns they follow and how these patterns are understood by them. There are models intended for universal imitation, but there are also ones designed only for a narrow circle of people. Don Quixote is a unique model: he is imitated precisely because he was able to selflessly follow the model he himself had chosen. A model can be a real person, taken in all the diversity of his inherent properties, but a person’s behavior in a certain, rather narrow area can also act as a model: there are examples of love for one’s neighbor, love of life, self-sacrifice, etc. The model can also be the behavior of a fictional person: a literary hero, a hero of myth, etc. Sometimes such a hero does not act as a complete person, but demonstrates only individual virtues through his behavior. You can, for example, imitate Ivan the Terrible or Pierre Bezukhov, but you can also strive to follow in your behavior the altruism of Dr. P.F. Haas or the love of Don Juan. Indifference to a model can itself look like a model: the example is sometimes set to someone who knows how to avoid the temptation of imitation. If the model is an integral person, who usually has not only merits, but also certain shortcomings, it often happens that his shortcomings have a greater impact on people’s behavior than his undeniable advantages. As B. Pascal noted, “the example of the purity of morals of Alexander the Great is much less likely to incline people to abstinence, while the example of his drunkenness inclines people to licentiousness. It’s not at all shameful to be less virtuous than him, and it’s forgivable to be just as vicious.”

Along with samples, there are also anti-samples. The task of the latter is to provide repulsive examples of behavior and thereby discourage such behavior. The effect of the anti-sample on some people is more effective than the effect of the sample. As factors determining behavior, the model and the anti-model are not entirely equal. Not everything that can be said about a model is equally applicable to an anti-model, which is, as a rule, less defined and can only be correctly interpreted by comparing it with a specific model: what does it mean to not resemble Sancho Panza in your behavior , is understandable only to those who know the behavior of Don Quixote.

Argumentation to a pattern is common in fiction. Here it is, as a rule, indirect in nature: the reader must choose a sample based on indirect instructions from the author.

Along with patterns of human actions, there are also samples of other things: objects, events, situations, etc. The first samples are usually called ideals, second – standards. For all objects that a person regularly encounters, be it hammers, watches, medicines, etc., there are standards that indicate what objects of this kind should be. Referring to these standards is a common argument used to support assessments. A standard for a particular type of item usually takes into account its typical function; in addition to functional properties, it may also include some morphological characteristics. For example, no hammer can be called good if it cannot be used to hammer nails; it will also not be good if, while allowing you to drive nails, it still has a bad handle.

The most important and common way to justify estimates is target justification for assessments.

Target justification is the justification of a positive assessment of an object by reference to the fact that with its help another object that has a positive value can be obtained.

For example, you should do exercises in the morning, as this promotes health; one must return good for good, as this leads to justice in relations between people, etc. Purpose rationale is sometimes called motivational; if the goals mentioned in it are not human goals, it is usually called teleological.

The central and most important way of empirical substantiation of descriptive statements is the derivation of logical consequences from the substantiated position and their subsequent experimental verification. Confirmation of consequences is evidence in favor of the truth of the position itself. General scheme of indirect empirical confirmation:

(1) From A logically follows IN; IN confirmed by experience; it means probably A true.

This is inductive reasoning; the truth of the premises does not ensure the truth of the conclusion. Empirical confirmation can also rely on confirmation in experience of the effect of a causal relationship. The general scheme of such causal confirmation is:

(2) A is the reason B; consequence B occurs; so that's probably the reason A also occurs.

An analogue of scheme (1) for empirical confirmation is the following scheme quasi-empirical justification(confirmation) ratings:

(1*) From A logically follows IN; IN A

For example: “If we go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater, then we will go to the theater tomorrow; It’s good that we’ll go to the theater tomorrow; So, apparently, it’s good that we’ll go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater.” This is an inductive reasoning that justifies one assessment (“It’s good that we will go to the cinema tomorrow and go to the theater”) by reference to another assessment (“It’s good that we will go to the theater tomorrow”).

An analogue of scheme (2) for causal confirmation of descriptive statements is the following scheme quasi-empirical target justification(confirmation) ratings:

(2*) A is the reason B; consequence B– positively valuable; so that's probably the reason A is also positively valuable.

For example: “If it rains at the beginning of summer, the harvest will be large; It’s good that there will be a big harvest; So, apparently, it’s good that it rains at the beginning of summer.” This is again inductive reasoning, justifying one evaluation (“It’s good that it’s raining at the beginning of summer”) by reference to another evaluation (“It’s good that there will be a big harvest”) and a certain causal connection.

In schemes (1*) and (2*) we are talking about quasi-empirical justification, since the confirmed consequences are estimates, and not empirical (descriptive) statements.

In scheme (2*) the premise “ A is the reason B"is a descriptive statement that relates the cause A with investigation B. If a given effect is asserted to be positively valuable, the cause-effect relationship becomes a means-end relationship. Scheme (2*) can be reformulated as follows:

A there is a means to an end IN; IN– positively valuable; it means probably A also positively valuable.

Reasoning following this scheme justifies means by reference to the positive value of the goal achieved with their help. It is, one might say, an expanded formulation of the well-known and always controversial principle “The end justifies the means.” The disputes are explained by the inductive nature of the principle of goal justification (justification): the goal probably, but not always and not necessarily, justifies the means.

Another scheme for quasi-empirical target justification of estimates is the scheme:

(2**) Non- A there is a reason not- B; But B– positively valuable; it means probably A is also positively valuable.

For example: “If you don’t hurry up, we won’t get to the start of the performance; It would be nice to be there for the start of the performance; So, apparently, you should hurry up.”

It is sometimes argued that purposive justification for evaluations is deductive reasoning. However, it is not. Purpose justification, and in particular the so-called practical syllogism, represents inductive reasoning.

Purposeful justification for evaluations is widely used in a variety of areas of evaluative reasoning, from everyday, moral, and political discussions to methodological, philosophical and scientific discussions.

Here is a typical example taken from B. Russell:

“Most of the opponents of the Lockean school,” writes Russell, “admired war as a heroic phenomenon and implying contempt for comfort and peace. Those who embraced utilitarian ethics, on the other hand, tended to consider most wars to be madness. This again, at least in the 19th century, led them to an alliance with the capitalists, who did not like wars, since wars interfered with trade. The motives of the capitalists, of course, were purely selfish, but they led to views more in tune with general interests than the views of the militarists and their ideologists.” This passage mentions three different target arguments to justify or condemn war:

War is a heroic phenomenon and fosters contempt for comfort and peace; heroism and contempt for comfort and peace are positively valuable; This means that war is also positively valuable.

War not only does not contribute to general happiness, but, on the contrary, seriously impedes it; general happiness is something to which we should strive in every possible way; This means that war must be categorically avoided.

War interferes with trade; trade is positively valuable; This means war is harmful.

The persuasiveness of the goal justification for the audience depends significantly on three circumstances: first, how effective is the connection between the goal and the means that are proposed to achieve it; secondly, whether the remedy itself is sufficiently acceptable; thirdly, how acceptable and important is the assessment that captures the goal for a given audience. The same target rationale may have different persuasiveness in different audiences. This means that goal justification refers to contextual (situational) methods of argumentation.

Regardless of how valuable the goal is and the extent to which the means proposed to achieve it are acceptable, goal justification is inductive reasoning. Even if the causal connection used is strong, the proposed means is quite acceptable, and the goal is significant, the conclusion of the goal justification is a problematic statement that needs further justification.

Two more examples of goal justification, taken from the 18th century philosopher. J. Locke. Locke writes in one place that a man should not have so many plums that neither he nor his family can eat, since they will spoil, but he may have as much gold and diamonds as he can legally obtain, for gold and diamonds do not deteriorate. Apparently Locke reasoned: “If a man has too many plums, some of them are sure to spoil; it’s bad when plums spoil; This means you can’t have too many plums.” This reasoning is an attempt to purposefully substantiate the norm “You can’t have too many plums.” The argument is unconvincing because its first premise is not a true statement: it does not occur to Locke that the owner of a large number of plums can sell or give them away before they spoil.

Locke's second purpose: “Precious metals are the source of money and social inequality; economic inequality is deplorable and condemnable; therefore, precious metals deserve condemnation.” Locke accepted the first premise of this reasoning, deplored, albeit purely theoretically, economic inequality, and at the same time did not think that it would be wise to take steps that could prevent this inequality. There is no logical inconsistency in such a position, since in this goal justification, as in any other, the conclusion does not follow logically from the premises.

Methods of theoretical argumentation in support of assessments include their deductive justification, systemic argumentation (in particular, internal restructuring of the theory), demonstration of the compatibility of the justified assessment with other accepted assessments, its compliance with certain general evaluative principles, methodological justification, etc. We can say that theoretical argumentation in support of evaluative statements, including norms, are in many ways parallel to the theoretical justification of descriptive statements: almost all methods of argumentation applicable in the case of descriptions can also be used to justify evaluations. The exception is the analysis of statements from the point of view of the possibility of their empirical confirmation and refutation: assessments cannot be required to allow the fundamental possibility of refutation by empirical data and presuppose certain procedures for their confirmation by such data.

Deductive substantiation of assessments consists of deducing a substantiated assessment statement from other, previously accepted assessments. The study of the deduction of some assessments from others is carried out evaluation logic And deontic(normative) logics.

Systematic justification of assessments is their inclusion in a seemingly well-founded system of evaluative statements as its constituent elements.

An important step in the theoretical substantiation of evaluative statements is to demonstrate their compatibility with existing evaluations and their systems in the field under consideration. The new assessment must be in agreement not only with already accepted and established assessments and their systems, but also with certain general principles, similar to the principles of simplicity, familiarity, beauty, etc.

Further, methodological argumentation, consisting of a reference to the fact that the assessment was obtained using a method that has repeatedly demonstrated its reliability, may have a certain significance in substantiating an evaluative statement.

Each successful act of understanding imparts a certain additional support to the general assessment or norm on the basis of which it is carried out.

A special role in substantiating evaluative statements is played by contextual methods of justification, including arguments to intuition, tradition, common sense, taste, etc.

The process of arguing in support of assessments typically uses a variety of justifications, ranging from deductive reasoning to appeals to intuition and tradition. Most often, contextual rather than universal arguments are used, since assessments vary from one circle of people to another and only a few of the assessments seem to be generally accepted. A typical example in this regard is the principles of morality. If morality rests to a certain extent on argumentation, then on argumentation that includes all its possible methods, and not some selected methods that are especially suitable for justifying morality.

Theoretical argumentation

argumentation based on reasoning and without direct reference to experience. A. t. is opposed to empirical argumentation, directly appealing to what is given in experience. Methods of analytical theory, in contrast to methods of empirical argumentation, are extremely diverse and internally heterogeneous. They include deductive reasoning, systemic argumentation, methodological argumentation, etc. There is no single, consistently carried out classification of methods of analytical theory.

Deductive (logical) argumentation is the derivation of a substantiated position from other, previously accepted provisions. It does not make such a position absolutely reliable and irrefutable, but it fully transfers to it the degree of reliability that is inherent in the premises of deduction. Deductive argumentation is universal: it applies to all areas of reasoning and to any audience.

The value of deductive argumentation has long been overestimated. Ancient mathematicians, and after them ancient philosophers, insisted on the exclusive use of deductive reasoning, since it is deduction that leads to absolute truths and eternal values. Medieval philosophers and theologians also exaggerated the role of deductive argumentation. They were interested only in the most general truths concerning God, man and the world. But to establish that God is essentially good, that man is only his likeness, and that there is a divine order in the world, deductive reasoning, starting from a few general principles, is much more suitable than induction and empirical argumentation. It is characteristic that all the proposed proofs of the existence of God were intended by their authors as deductions from self-evident premises. Deductive argumentation was overrated as long as the study of the world was speculative in nature and experience, observation and experiment were alien to it.

Systematic argumentation is the substantiation of a statement by including it as a constituent element in a seemingly well-founded system of statements or theory. Confirmation of the consequences arising from the theory is at the same time a reinforcement of the theory itself. On the other hand, a theory imparts certain impulses and strength to the propositions put forward on its basis and thereby contributes to their justification. A statement that has become an element of a theory is based not only on individual facts, but in many ways also on a wide range of phenomena explained by the theory, on its prediction of new, previously unknown effects, on its connections with other theories, etc. Inclusion of a statement in a theory extends to it the empirical and theoretical support that the theory as a whole has. The connection of the statement being justified with the system of statements of which it is an element significantly affects the empirical verifiability of this statement and, accordingly, the argumentation that can be put forward in its support. In the context of its system ("practice"), a statement can be accepted as undoubted, not subject to criticism and not requiring justification in at least two cases. Firstly, if discarding this statement means rejecting a certain practice, from that integral system of statements of which it is an integral element. Such, for example, is the statement “The sky is blue”: it does not require verification and does not allow doubt, otherwise the entire practice of visual perception and color discrimination will be destroyed. By rejecting the statement “The sun will rise tomorrow,” we question all natural science. Doubting the reliability of the statement “If a person’s head is cut off, it will not grow back” calls into question the entire physiology, etc. These and similar statements are not substantiated empirically, but by reference to that established and well-tested system of statements, the constituent elements which they are and which would have to be abandoned if they were rejected. English philosopher J. Moore once wondered: how could one justify the statement “I have a hand”? The answer to this question is simple: this statement is obvious and does not require any justification within the framework of human perception; to doubt it would be to question the whole practice. Secondly, a statement must be accepted as undoubted if it has become, within the framework of the corresponding system of statements, a standard for evaluating its other statements and, as a result, has lost its empirical verifiability. Such a statement moves from the category of descriptions to the category of assessments, its connection with our other beliefs becomes comprehensive. Such unverifiable statements include, in particular: “There are physical objects”, “Objects continue to exist even when they are not given to anyone in perception”, “The Earth existed long before I was born”, etc. They are so closely connected with everything our other statements that practically do not allow exceptions from our system of knowledge. The systemic nature of justification does not mean, however, that a single empirical statement cannot be substantiated or refuted outside the framework of the theoretical system to which it belongs.

The theory gives additional support to its constituent statements, due to which the stronger the theory itself, the clearer and more reliable it is, the greater the support. Improving the theory, strengthening its empirical base and clarifying its general, including philosophical and methodological, premises is at the same time a significant contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it. Among the ways to clarify a theory, a special role is played by identifying the logical connections of its statements, minimizing its initial assumptions, constructing it on the basis of an axiomatic method in the form of an axiomatic system, and, finally, if possible, its formalization. The construction of a scientific theory in the form of an axiomatized deductive system is possible, however, only for a very narrow range of scientific theories. Therefore, it cannot be the ideal and the ultimate goal to which every scientific theory should strive, and the achievement of which would mark the limit of its improvement. Another method of analytical theory is the analysis of a statement from the point of view of the possibility of its empirical confirmation and refutation. Scientific propositions are required to allow the fundamental possibility of refutation and require certain procedures for their confirmation. If this is not the case, it is impossible to say regarding the proposition put forward which situations and facts are incompatible with it and which support it. The position, which in principle does not allow refutation and confirmation, is beyond constructive criticism; it does not outline any real ways for further research. A statement that is not comparable either with experience or with existing knowledge cannot be considered justified. It can hardly be called justified, for example, the statement that exactly one year later in the same place it will be sunny and dry. It is not based on any facts; it is impossible to even imagine how it could be refuted or confirmed, if not now, then at least in the near future. This class of statements also includes statements such as “Eternal essence is movement”, “Eternal essence is one”, “It is not true that our perception is capable of embracing all forms of existence”, “What the soul itself can express about itself never exceeds hers," etc.

An important method of analytical theory is to check the substantiated statement to see if it fulfills the compatibility condition that requires each hypothesis to correspond to the laws, principles, theories, etc. available in the area under consideration.

Methodological argumentation is the substantiation of a separate statement or an entire concept by reference to the undoubtedly reliable method by which the substantiated statement or defended concept was obtained.

Dictionary of logic. - M.: Tumanit, ed. VLADOS center. A.A.Ivin, A.L.Nikiforov. 1997 .

See what “theoretical argumentation” is in other dictionaries:

Argumentation based on reasoning and without direct reference to experience. A.t. is opposed to empirical argumentation, directly appealing to what is given in experience. Methods A.t. in contrast to empirical methods... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

Argumentation, an integral part of which is a reference to experience, to empirical data. A.e. is contrasted with theoretical argumentation, based on reasoning and not using direct references to experience. The difference between A.e. And… … Philosophical Encyclopedia

Argumentation, an integral part of which is a reference to experience, to empirical data. A. e. is contrasted with theoretical argumentation, which is based on reasoning and does not directly use references to experience. The difference between A. e. And … Dictionary of Logic Terms

A theory that studies the various discussion techniques that are used in the process of argumentation. A. t., which began to take shape in antiquity, has gone through a long history, rich in ups and downs. Now we can talk about the formation of a new... Dictionary of Logic Terms

A theory that studies the variety of discursive techniques used by some people to change the beliefs of other people (the audience). AT, which began to take shape in antiquity, has gone through a long history, rich in ups and downs. Now you can... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

A system of categories, values, regulatory principles, methods of justification, samples, etc., which guide the scientific community in its activities. N.m. assumes: a fairly stable and clear system of categories serving... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

Presentation of those convincing arguments or arguments by virtue of which the k.l. should be accepted. statement or concept. O. usually includes a whole series of mental actions relating not only to the position under consideration, but also to that system... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

The procedure for carrying out those convincing arguments, or arguments, on the basis of which a k.l. should be accepted. statement or concept. O. is, as a rule, a complex process that cannot be reduced to constructing a separate conclusion or conducting... ... Dictionary of Logic Terms

NATURAL THEOLOGY- [lat. theologia naturalis], a term delineating a special area of ​​philosophical theological reflection and research, the common characteristic of which is the recognition as a starting fact that every person naturally ... ... Orthodox Encyclopedia

- (from Latin deductio deduction) a transition from premises to a conclusion, based on a logical law, due to which the conclusion follows with logical necessity from the accepted premises. A characteristic feature of D. is that from true premises... ... Philosophical Encyclopedia

Books

• The many faces of sophistry. Illegitimate argumentation in the intellectual culture of Europe of the Middle Ages, Oleg Sergeevich Voskoboynikov, Nikolay Evgenievich Aslamov, Dmitry Aleksandrovich Bayuk, The monograph combines research aimed at analyzing illegitimate argumentation in various areas of the intellectual culture of the West of the Middle Ages and early modern times:... Publisher: HSE Publishing House,
• The many faces of sophistry and illegitimate argumentation in the intellectual culture of Europe in the Middle Ages and early modern times,

To begin with, you always need to refer to the assessment criteria for the task that we are analyzing. Download it and continue reading:

Download demo version of the Unified State Exam in Social Studies 201 7

Isolating the problem

So, let's look at the very last pages of the document that you downloaded and take a look at points K1-K3, trying to extract from this the formula for a good essay that will be evaluated by experts

First, you need to directly understand the statement: identify the problem, reveal its meaning and highlight aspects of the problem. A number of cliches will help you here, because the exam is traditionally built on templates and this helps in preparation

What are the problems in the exam? From my experience, I can identify 6 main “flanks” on which you need to try your aphorism:

• Essence problem...
• The problem of inconsistency...
• Role problem...
• Relationship problem...
• Relationship problem...
• The problem of unity...

What does it mean to reveal meaning? In general, I tell my students that the essay must be translated “from Russian into Russian”, in fact from a literary language to a scientific one, based on the block in which you are writing your work. You can end everything with a “reason for increasing your score”: looking at the problem from different angles. This will be the structure of the first part of the essay.

Theoretical argument

Now we move on to the second criterion, which involves argumentation based on theory. What does this mean and what parts should your essay include?
Naturally, these are terms. Hence, if you are an applicant preparing on your own, ALWAYS study this or that topic in the context of any concepts from the area that you are studying

You must also clearly, clearly and consistently formulate your statements and conclusions from what you stated in the thesis of your essay - this is a very important element, pay attention to it. In addition, it is necessary to cite various principles and approaches as examples, prove your position and reveal the causes and consequences of the events discussed in the formulation of the assignment

Factual Argumentation

As factual evidence, you must prove the theoretical material discussed above with the help of media reports, materials from educational subjects (usually humanities), facts from social experience and your own reasoning. The most interesting thing is that you need to provide 2 ARGUMENTS of a factual nature, both of which cannot be from media reports, or history, political life... This is important to understand, otherwise the expert will reduce your score

Well, at the end you make a qualitative conclusion based on the thesis, simply writing it in other words, with a “shade” of completeness. This is all you need to know from the theory of how to write the 29th task in social studies

Speech by T. Liskova - Features of solving the second part at the Unified State Exam-2017

A video of her performance is attached below.

Ready-made essays

Now let's look at the structure. Below I attach 4 of my students’ very first works on politics. I suggest you look through them, highlight the constituent elements, find errors, if any, and write about them in the comments

First essay

“Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely” (J. Acton)

In his statement, the American historian and politician J. Acton raises the question of the influence of power on the behavior of the person who has it. This statement can be interpreted as follows: the more power a person is given, the more often he begins to go beyond the boundaries of what is permitted and act only in his own interests. This problem has not lost its relevance for many centuries and history knows many cases when the unlimited power of a ruler led a country to ruin.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

So what is power and why does it exist? Power is the opportunity and ability to influence people's behavior regardless of their desire to do so. In any state, power is primarily aimed at maintaining order and monitoring compliance with laws, but often the more limitless power becomes, the more it corrupts a person and ceases to be a guarantor of justice, which is why I fully support the opinion of J. Acton.

Examples for revealing K3

A ruler endowed with great power ceases to care about the welfare of the entire people and tries even more to strengthen his position. Let's take, for example, the first Russian Tsar Ivan IV the Terrible: striving for unlimited autocracy, he introduced oprichnina in the camp, which consisted of mass terror, violence, and the elimination of not only the dissatisfied boyars, but also any opposition. Thus, many innocent people were executed on suspicion of treason, which ultimately led the country to a crisis, the destruction of cities and the death of a huge number of people.

My family also faced the consequences of unlimited power during the reign of I.V. Stalin. During dispossession, my grandmother’s family was repressed, her father was sent to the Gulag, and six children were forced to live in a barracks with similarly repressed families. Stalin's policy was aimed at equalizing layers of the population, but the number of those dispossessed during his reign significantly exceeded the number of real kulaks, which is a clear violation of human rights and freedoms.

Thus, we can come to the conclusion that unlimited power corrupts people and brings not so much benefit as ruin and a decline in the standard of living of the population. In modern society, absolute power no longer prevails in most countries, which makes their inhabitants more free and independent.

Second essay

“When a tyrant rules, the people are silent and the laws do not apply” (Saadi)

I see the meaning of Saadi’s statement in the fact that legality is the basis for building a democratic state, while tyranny opposes the public good and is aimed only at achieving its own interests. This statement expresses two aspects: the participation of citizens in the life of the state under different political regimes and the attitude of the government to generally accepted laws.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

Tyranny is often inherent in states with unlimited power of one ruler; for the most part, these are countries with totalitarian regimes. Its main difference from democracy, a political regime characterized by the equality of all people before the law and power belonging to the people, is the concentration of all power in the hands of one ruler (party) and control over all spheres of society. With unlimited power, the ruler can interpret laws in his own favor, or even rewrite them, and the people do not have the right to express their own opinion, which absolutely does not correspond to the principle of legality. One cannot but agree with Saadi’s opinion, and history knows many proofs of this.

Examples for revealing K3

An example of tyranny is Italy during the reign of B. Mussolini. Having suppressed rights and freedoms in the country, Mussolini established a totalitarian regime and applied political repression. Heading seven ministries and serving as prime minister at the same time, he eliminated virtually all restrictions on his power, thus building a police state.

A. Solzhenitsyn speaks about the lawlessness of the totalitarian regime in the story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.” The work shows the life of a former soldier who, like many others, ended up in prison after the front. Solzhenitsyn described the situation of people during the reign of I.V. Stalin, when soldiers who managed to escape from German captivity were declared enemies of the people and, instead of getting to their relatives, were forced to work in a colony for decades.

Having considered these examples, we can come to the conclusion that under the rule of a tyrant, human rights have no weight, and the people do not have the right to openly express their opinions, since they are constantly in fear for their lives.

Third essay

In his statement, P. Sir expressed his attitude to the problem of the characteristic features and characteristics of power. The author argues that any decisions that a person in power will ever have to make must be carefully thought out and analyzed from all sides. These words can be considered from two points of view: the positive and negative influence of power on society.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

P. Sir's statement does not lose its relevance to this day, because all the time, rash actions led to bad consequences both for the leaders themselves and for those who subordinate to them. That is why I completely share the author’s point of view regarding this problem. In order to confirm its relevance, it is first worth considering it from a theoretical point of view.

It’s worth starting with the simplest thing: what is power? As we know, power is the ability to influence the actions and decisions of people against their wishes. This usually happens both through persuasion and propaganda, and through the use of violence. Power is an integral attribute of any organization and human group, because without it, order and organization simply cannot be formed. The main sources of power can be identified as the personal attitude of each subordinate to the leader, and the level of his authority, material condition, level of education and strength.

Examples for revealing K3

To confirm the relevance of P. Cyr's statement, we can give an example from history. The monetary reform carried out by Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, which replaced silver money with copper, may act as ill-considered actions. Due to the shortage of coins made from the latter material in the treasury, it was silver coins that collected taxes, which soon led to the almost complete depreciation of copper coins. The reform, which did not foresee such a scenario, did not allow the situation to be corrected, which led to the Copper Riot of 1662. The result of the uprising was the withdrawal of copper coins from circulation. This example clearly illustrates the lack of thoughtfulness and logic in the actions of a politician who had to cancel the transformation he had carried out in order to calm the angry people.

As a second example, this time of successful and planned transformations, we can cite events from recent history. We are talking about the policy of the Russian Federation, pursued from the beginning of its existence. Thoughtful, systematic reforms were able to strengthen the disintegrated country. Also, the effect of these transformations was the strengthening of the state and its position in the international economic and political arena. This example shows us that a policy that does not involve sudden and thoughtless transformations, but structured and consistent reforms can lead to an improvement in the situation in the state.

To summarize, we can say that the problem of the characteristics of power and its characteristic features will never cease to be one of the most important issues, on the solution of which the fate of states depends and will continue to depend. Especially now, in the post-industrial age, which is characterized by globalization, incorrectly implemented reforms can have an impact not on individual countries, but on all powers together.

Fourth essay

“The state is something without which it is impossible to achieve either order, justice, or external security.” (M. Debre)

In his statement, M. Debre expressed his attitude towards the main functions of the state and their importance. According to the author, it is the state apparatus that plays a decisive role in the life of society, controlling the norms and rules of its behavior, regulating basic laws, and also being responsible for protecting the country’s borders and maintaining the safety of its population. This issue can be considered from two sides: the importance of the role of the state in the life of society and the ways in which the former influences the latter.

The words of M. Debre do not lose their relevance to this day, because regardless of the chronological period, the state has always played a key role in people's lives. That is why I completely share the author’s point of view. In order to confirm these words, it is first worth considering them from a theoretical point of view.

Disclosure of the theoretical part

What is the state itself? As we know from the course of political science, a state can be called any organization of political power that has a mechanism for managing society that ensures the normal functioning of the latter. The functions of the state are not limited to any one area of ​​life, but affect their entirety. In addition to internal functions, there are also external ones, the most important of which is the process of ensuring the defense of the territory of the state and establishing international cooperation.

Examples for revealing K3

To give the first example, let us turn to ancient history. States among all peoples began to form for similar reasons, but in this case we will consider this process and its consequences using the example of the East Slavic tribes. One of the main prerequisites for the formation of the Old Russian state was the need for protection from an external enemy - the Khazar Kaganate. Scattered and warring tribes could not cope with the enemy alone, but after the formation of the state, victory over the nomads was only a matter of time. This clearly illustrates to us the effect of one of the most important functions of the state - defensive.

The following example illustrating the impact of the state on society can be cited from New History. As you know, in 1861 Alexander II carried out a peasant reform, the result of which was the abolition of serfdom. This phenomenon had a great impact on the lives of Russian people, because most of the population of the Russian Empire at that time were nothing more than serfs. By granting them freedom, the state significantly expanded the rights and responsibilities of the freed peasants. The consequence of the abolition of serfdom was the formation of a new social stratum, a change in the foundations and customs that had developed over several centuries. This example shows us the consequences of government reform, which affected the entire population of the country.

To summarize, we can say that the importance of the role of the state and the necessity of the functions it performs are time-tested. Without influencing, exerting any influence on the citizens of the country, the state apparatus simply cannot exist, and the changes it makes can be perceived differently by citizens

I hope the article helped you deal with a rather problematic exam question. Help spread the word in this article by clicking on the social media buttons and subscribing to blog updates to receive new articles in your email promptly. Bye everyone

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As a result of studying this chapter, the student should: know

• how theoretical argumentation differs from empirical argumentation;
• what is systemic argumentation;
• what is the essence of the compatibility condition;
• possibilities of methodological argumentation;
• boundaries of empirical and theoretical justification; be able to
• apply theoretical arguments in support of the proposed provisions;
• realistically assess the importance of the requirements of beauty, familiarity and simplicity;
• feel the limits of applicability of theoretical argumentation; own
• ability to apply theoretical argumentation;
• skills in using the recommendatory requirements of simplicity, familiarity, beauty, etc.;
• techniques for applying methodological argumentation.

Systemic argumentation

Earlier, one of the methods of theoretical argumentation was already considered - logical justification, or justification through the construction of a logical proof. Various other methods of theoretical justification will be discussed below. These include systemic argumentation, compliance of the newly put forward position with already accepted statements, its agreement with some general principles similar to the principle of familiarity, and methodological argumentation.

General statements, scientific laws, principles, etc. cannot be justified purely empirically, by reference only to experience. They also require theoretical justification, based on reasoning and referring to other accepted statements. Without this there is neither abstract theoretical knowledge nor well-founded beliefs.

It is impossible to prove a general statement by reference to evidence relating to specific cases of its applicability. Universal generalizations are a kind of hypotheses built on the basis of significantly incomplete series of observations. Such universal statements cannot be proven from the observations from which they were generalized, or even from the subsequent extensive and detailed series of predictions derived from them and confirmed by experience.

Theories, concepts and other generalizations of empirical material are not logically derived from this material. The same set of facts can be generalized in different ways and covered by different theories. Moreover, none of them will be completely consistent with all the known facts in their field. The facts and theories themselves not only constantly diverge from each other, but are never clearly separated from each other.

All this suggests that the agreement of a theory with experiments, facts or observations is not enough to unambiguously assess its acceptability. Empirical argumentation always requires the addition of theoretical argumentation. It is not empirical experience, but theoretical reasoning that is usually decisive when choosing one of the competing concepts.

In contrast to empirical argumentation, the methods of theoretical argumentation are extremely diverse and internally heterogeneous. These include deductive reasoning, systemic argumentation, methodological argumentation, etc. There is no single, consistently carried out classification of methods of theoretical argumentation.

It is difficult to identify a provision that would be justified on its own, in isolation from other provisions. Justification is always systemic in nature. The inclusion of a new provision in a system of other provisions, which imparts stability to its elements, is one of the most significant steps in its justification.

Systematic argumentation is the substantiation of a statement by including it as a constituent element in a seemingly well-founded system of statements, or theory.

Confirmation of the consequences arising from a theory simultaneously strengthens the theory itself. On the other hand, a theory imparts certain impulses and strength to the propositions put forward on its basis and thereby contributes to their justification. A statement that has become an element of a theory is based not only on individual facts, but in many ways also on a wide range of phenomena explained by the theory, on its prediction of new, previously unknown effects, on its connections with other theories, etc. The analyzed position included in the theory receives the empirical and theoretical support that the theory as a whole has.

L. Wittgenstein wrote about the integrity and systematic nature of knowledge: “It is not an isolated axiom that strikes me as obvious, but a whole system in which consequences and premises mutually support each other.” Systematicity extends not only to theoretical positions, but also to the data of experience: “We can say,” Wittgenstein continues, “that experience teaches us some statements. However, he teaches us not isolated statements, but a whole set of interdependent sentences. If they were separate, I might doubt them, because I do not have experience directly related to each of them." The foundations of a system of statements do not support this system, but are themselves supported by it. This means that the reliability of the foundations is determined not by them in themselves, but by the fact that an integral theoretical system can be built on top of them.

Doubt, as Wittgenstein makes clear, concerns not an isolated sentence, but always some situation in which I behave in a certain way.

For example, when I take letters out of my mailbox and look to see who they are addressed to, I check to see that they are all addressed to me, and at the same time I firmly hold the belief that my name is B.P. And since I continue to check in this way, for me Whether all these letters, I cannot meaningfully doubt my name. Doubt makes sense only within the framework of some “language game” or established practice, provided that its rules are accepted. Therefore, it makes no sense for me to doubt that I have two hands or that the Earth existed 150 years before my birth, because there is no practice within which, when accepting its premises, one could doubt these things.

According to Wittgenstein, empirical proposals can be tested and confirmed experimentally in some situations. But there are situations when they, being included in a system of statements, in specific practice, are not verified and are themselves used as a basis for testing other proposals. This is the case in the example discussed above. “My name is B.P.” - an empirical proposition used as a basis for testing the statement “All letters are addressed to me.” However, it is possible to come up with a story (“practice”) when I have to check, on the basis of other data and evidence, whether I am called B.P. In both cases, the status of an empirical sentence depends on the context, on the system of statements of which it is an element. Without context, it is meaningless to ask whether a given proposition is empirically testable or whether I firmly hold it.

When we firmly hold a belief, we are usually more likely to doubt the source of contradictory evidence than the belief itself. However, when these data become so numerous that they interfere with the use of the belief in question to evaluate other statements, we can part with it.

In addition to the empirical, Wittgenstein identifies methodological proposals. They are also random in the sense that their negation would not be a logical contradiction. However, they are not verifiable in any context. External similarities can confuse us and encourage us to treat empirical propositions like “There are red dogs” and methodological ones like “There are physical objects” in the same way. But the point is that we cannot imagine a situation in which we could be convinced of the falsity of a methodological proposal. This no longer depends on the context, but on the totality of all imaginary experience.

Wittgenstein distinguishes two other kinds of sentences: sentences that I can hardly doubt, and sentences that are difficult to classify (for example, the statement that I have never been to another solar system).

At one time, Descartes insisted on the need for the most complete and radical doubt possible. According to Descartes, only his famous “ cogito" - the proposition “I think, therefore I exist.” Wittgenstein takes the opposite position: strong reasons are needed for doubt, moreover, there are categories of statements whose acceptability we should never doubt. The identification of these categories of statements is directly determined by the systemic nature of human knowledge, its internal integrity and unity.

The connection of the statement being justified with the system of statements within which it is put forward and operates significantly affects the empirical verifiability of this statement and, accordingly, the argumentation that can be put forward in its support. In the context of its system (“language game”, “practice”), a statement can be accepted as undoubted, not subject to criticism and not requiring justification in at least two cases.

Firstly, if rejecting this statement means rejecting a certain practice, from that holistic system of statements of which it is an integral element.

For example, the statement “The sky is blue” does not require verification and does not allow doubt, otherwise the entire practice of visual perception and color discrimination would be destroyed. By rejecting the statement “The sun will rise tomorrow,” we question all natural science. Doubting the authenticity of the statement “If a person’s head is cut off, it will not grow back” calls into question all of physiology, etc.

These and similar statements are not substantiated empirically, but by reference to that established and well-tested system of statements of which they are constituent elements and which would have to be abandoned if they were discarded. The English philosopher and ethicist J. Moore once wondered: how could one substantiate the statement “I have a hand”? According to Wittgenstein, the answer to this question is simple: the statement is obvious and requires no justification within the human practice of perception; to doubt it would be to question the whole practice.

Secondly, a statement must be accepted as undoubted if, within the framework of the corresponding system of statements, it has become the standard for evaluating its other statements and, as a result, has lost its empirical verifiability. Among such statements that have moved from the category of descriptions to the category of values, two types can be distinguished:

• statements that are not verified within a certain, rather narrow practice. For example, a person viewing mail while he is engaged in this activity cannot doubt his name;
• statements that are not verified within the framework of any, no matter how broad, practice.

For example, statements that Wittgenstein called methodological: “There are physical objects,” “I cannot be mistaken in the fact that I have a hand,” etc. The connection between these statements and our other beliefs is almost universal. Such statements do not depend on a specific context, but on the totality of all imaginary experience, which makes their revision practically impossible. The situation is similar with the statements “The earth existed before I was born,” “Objects continue to exist even when they are not given to anyone in perception,” etc.: they are so closely connected with all our other statements that they practically do not allow exceptions from our knowledge system.

The systematic nature of a scientific statement depends on its connection with the system of statements (or practice) within which it is used. We can distinguish five types of statements, which relate differently to the practice of their use:

• 1) statements regarding which it is not only possible, but also reasonable to doubt within the framework of specific practice;
• 2) statements about which doubt is possible, but is not reasonable in the given context (for example, the results of reliable measurements; information obtained from a case source);
• 3) statements that are not subject to doubt and verification in this practice under the threat of destruction of the latter;
• 4) statements that have become standards for evaluating other statements and therefore cannot be verified within the framework of this practice, but can be verified in other contexts;
• 5) methodological statements that are not verified in any practice.

Argumentation in support of statements of type 3 involves reference to the system of statements (or practice) of which the statements in question are an integral element. Argumentation in support of type 4 statements is based on identifying their evaluative nature, their necessity within a particular practice, and, finally, indicating the effectiveness of this practice. Statements of types 3 and 4 can be made subject to doubt, testing and justification by going beyond their practice, placing them in a wider or simply different context. As for the methodological statements included in every conceivable practice, the argumentation in their support can only be based on the conviction that there is a total correspondence between the totality of our knowledge and the outside world, on the confidence in the mutual consistency of all our knowledge and experience. However, a general reference to a cumulative, indivisible experience usually does not seem particularly convincing.

An important, but as yet almost unexplored way of justifying a theoretical statement is internal restructuring of the theory, within which it is put forward. This restructuring, or reformulation, involves the introduction of new models, norms, rules, assessments, principles, etc., changing the internal structure of both the theory itself and the “theoretical world” it postulates.

A new scientific, theoretical position is emerging not in a vacuum, but in a certain theoretical context. The context of the theory determines the specific form of the proposed position and the main vicissitudes of its subsequent justification. If a scientific assumption is taken in isolation from the theoretical environment in which it appears and exists, it remains unclear how it ultimately manages to become an element of reliable knowledge.

The making of assumptions is dictated by the dynamics of the development of the theory to which they relate, the desire to embrace it and explain new facts, eliminate internal inconsistency and inconsistency, etc. Much of the support a new position receives from a theory is due to the internal restructuring of that theory. It may consist in introducing nominal definitions (definitions-requirements) instead of real ones (definitions-descriptions), adopting additional agreements regarding the objects being studied, clarifying the fundamental principles of the theory, changing the hierarchy of these principles, etc.

A theory gives a certain force to its statements. This support largely depends on the position of the statement in the theory, in the hierarchy of its constituent statements. The restructuring of a theory, ensuring the movement of a statement from its “periphery” to its “core,” gives this statement greater systemic support. Let us explain this side of the matter with a few simple examples.

It is well known that liquid is a state of matter in which pressure is transmitted uniformly in all directions. Sometimes this feature of a liquid is used as the basis for its very definition. If we suddenly discovered a state of matter that resembled a liquid in everything, but did not have the property of uniform transmission of pressure, we could not consider this substance a liquid.

However, liquid was not always defined this way. For quite a long time, the claim that a fluid transmits pressure equally in all directions was just an assumption. It was tested for many liquids, but its applicability to all other, not yet studied liquids remained problematic. With the deepening of ideas about liquid, this statement turned into an empirical truth, and then into the definition of liquid as a special state of matter and thus became a tautology.

This transition from assumption to tautology was achieved due to two interrelated factors. On the one hand, new experimental material was involved, relating to different liquids and confirming the statement under consideration, and on the other, the theory of liquid itself was deepened and rebuilt, eventually including this statement in its core.

The chemical law of multiple ratios was originally a simple empirical hypothesis, which also had random and dubious confirmation. The work of the English chemist W. Dalton led to a radical restructuring of chemistry. The concept of multiple ratios became an integral part of the definition of chemical composition, and it became impossible to either verify or refute it experimentally. Atoms can combine only in a one-to-one ratio, or in some other simple, whole-number proportion—this is now the constructive principle of modern chemical theory.

This kind of internal restructuring of the theory can be illustrated with a simplified example. Let’s say we need to establish what unites the following cities: Vaduz, Valencia, Valletta, Vancouver, Vienna, Vientiane. One can immediately assume that these are cities that are capitals. Indeed, Vientiane is the capital of Laos, Vienna - of Austria, Valletta - of Malta, Vaduz - of Liechtenstein. But Valencia is not the capital of Spain, and Vancouver is not the capital of Canada. At the same time, Valencia is the main city of the Spanish province of the same name, and Vancouver is the main city of the Canadian province of the same name. To maintain the original hypothesis, the definition of the concept of capital should be clarified accordingly. We will understand by “capital” the main city of the state or its territorial part - province, region, etc. In this case, Valencia is the capital of the province of Valencia, and Vancouver is the capital of the province of Vancouver. Thanks to the restructuring of the “world of capitals”, we ensured that our initial assumption became true.

A theory gives its constituent statements additional support. The clearer and more reliable the theory itself, the greater the support. Because of this, improving the theory, strengthening its empirical base and clarifying its general, including philosophical and methodological, premises are at the same time a significant contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it.

Among the ways to clarify the theory, a special role is played by:

• identifying the logical connections of her statements;
• minimizing its initial assumptions;
• constructing it in the form of an axiomatic system;
• its formalization, if possible.

When axiomatizing a theory, some of its provisions are chosen as initial ones, and all other provisions are derived from them in a purely logical way.

Initial propositions accepted without proof are called

axioms (postulates); provisions proven on their basis -

theorems.

The axiomatic method of systematizing and clarifying knowledge originated in Antiquity and gained great fame thanks to Euclid’s “Elements” - the first axiomatic interpretation of geometry. Now axiomatization is used in mathematics, logic, as well as in certain branches of physics, biology, etc. The axiomatic method requires a high level of development of the axiomatized substantive theory and clear logical connections of its statements. This is due to its rather narrow applicability and the naivety of attempts to rebuild any science according to the model of Euclid’s geometry.

In addition, as the Austrian logician and mathematician K. Gödel showed, fairly rich scientific theories (for example, the arithmetic of natural numbers) do not allow complete axiomatization. This indicates the limitations of the axiomatic method and the impossibility of complete formalization of scientific knowledge.

The construction of a scientific theory in the form of an axiomatized deductive system cannot serve as an ideal and the ultimate goal, the achievement of which means the limit of improvement of the theory.

• Wittgenstein L. On Certainty. Oxford, 1969. P. 23.
• Wittgenstein L. On Certainty. R. 23.

Argumentation based on reasoning and without direct reference to experience. A. t. is opposed to empirical argumentation, directly appealing to what is given in experience. Methods of analytical theory, in contrast to methods of empirical argumentation, are extremely diverse and internally heterogeneous. They include deductive reasoning, systemic argumentation, methodological argumentation, etc. There is no single, consistently carried out classification of methods of analytical theory. Deductive (logical) argumentation is the derivation of a substantiated position from other, previously accepted provisions. It does not make such a position absolutely reliable and irrefutable, but it fully transfers to it the degree of reliability that is inherent in the premises of deduction. Deductive argumentation is universal: it applies to all areas of reasoning and to any audience. The value of deductive argumentation has long been overestimated. Ancient mathematicians, and after them ancient philosophers, insisted on the exclusive use of deductive reasoning, since it is deduction that leads to absolute truths and eternal values. Medieval philosophers and theologians also exaggerated the role of deductive argumentation. They were interested only in the most general truths concerning God, man and the world. But to establish that God is essentially good, that man is only his likeness, and that there is a divine order in the world, deductive reasoning, starting from a few general principles, is much more suitable than induction and empirical argumentation. It is characteristic that all the proposed proofs of the existence of God were intended by their authors as deductions from self-evident premises. Deductive argumentation was overrated as long as the study of the world was speculative in nature and experience, observation and experiment were alien to it. Systematic argumentation is the substantiation of a statement by including it as a constituent element in a seemingly well-founded system of statements or theory. Confirmation of the consequences arising from the theory is at the same time a reinforcement of the theory itself. On the other hand, a theory imparts certain impulses and strength to the propositions put forward on its basis and thereby contributes to their justification. A statement that has become an element of a theory is based not only on individual facts, but in many ways also on a wide range of phenomena explained by the theory, on its prediction of new, previously unknown effects, on its connections with other theories, etc. e. The inclusion of a statement in a theory extends to it the empirical and theoretical support that the theory as a whole has. The connection of the statement being justified with the system of statements of which it is an element significantly affects the empirical verifiability of this statement and, accordingly, the argumentation that can be put forward in its support. In the context of its system ("practice"), a statement can be accepted as undoubted, not subject to criticism and not requiring justification in at least two cases. Firstly, if discarding this statement means rejecting a certain practice, from that integral system of statements of which it is an integral element. Such, for example, is the statement “The sky is blue”: it does not require verification and does not allow doubt, otherwise the entire practice of visual perception and color discrimination will be destroyed. By rejecting the statement “The sun will rise tomorrow,” we question all natural science. Doubt about the reliability of the statement “If a person’s head is cut off, it will not grow back” calls into question the entire physiology, etc. These and similar statements are not substantiated empirically, but by reference to that established and well-tested system of statements, of which they are constituent elements are and which would have to be abandoned if they were rejected. English philosopher J. Moore once wondered: how could one justify the statement “I have a hand”? The answer to this question is simple: this statement is obvious and does not require any justification within the framework of human perception; to doubt it would be to question the whole practice. Secondly, a statement must be accepted as undoubted if it has become, within the framework of the corresponding system of statements, a standard for evaluating its other statements and, as a result, has lost its empirical verifiability. Such a statement moves from the category of descriptions to the category of assessments, its connection with our other beliefs becomes comprehensive. Such unverifiable statements include, in particular: “There are physical objects”, “Objects continue to exist even when they are not given to anyone in perception”, “The Earth existed long before I was born”, etc. They are so closely connected with everything our other statements that practically do not allow exceptions from our system of knowledge. The systemic nature of justification does not mean, however, that a single empirical statement cannot be substantiated or refuted outside the framework of the theoretical system to which it belongs. The theory gives additional support to its constituent statements, due to which the stronger the theory itself, the clearer and more reliable it is, the greater the support. Improving the theory, strengthening its empirical base and clarifying its general, including philosophical and methodological, premises is at the same time a significant contribution to the substantiation of the statements included in it. Among the ways to clarify a theory, a special role is played by identifying the logical connections of its statements, minimizing its initial assumptions, constructing it on the basis of an axiomatic method in the form of an axiomatic system, and, finally, if possible, its formalization. The construction of a scientific theory in the form of an axiomatized deductive system is possible, however, only for a very narrow range of scientific theories. It cannot therefore be the ideal and the ultimate goal to which every scientific theory should strive, and the achievement of which would mark the limit of its improvement. Another method of analytical theory is to analyze a statement from the point of view of the possibility of its empirical confirmation and refutation. Scientific propositions are required to allow the fundamental possibility of refutation and require certain procedures for their confirmation. If this is not the case, it is impossible to say regarding the proposition put forward which situations and facts are incompatible with it and which support it. The position, which in principle does not allow refutation and confirmation, is beyond constructive criticism; it does not outline any real ways for further research. A statement that is not comparable either with experience or with existing knowledge cannot be considered justified. It can hardly be called justified, for example, the statement that exactly one year later in the same place it will be sunny and dry. It is not based on any facts; it is impossible to even imagine how it could be refuted or confirmed, if not now, then at least in the near future. This class of statements also includes statements such as “Eternal essence is movement”, “Eternal essence is one”, “It is not true that our perception is capable of embracing all forms of existence”, “What the soul itself can express about itself never exceeds “its most”, etc. An important way of analytical theory is to check the substantiated statement to ensure that it fulfills the compatibility condition, which requires that each hypothesis correspond to the laws, principles, theories, etc. available in the area under consideration. Methodological argumentation is the substantiation of a separate statement or holistic concept by reference to the undoubtedly reliable method by which the justified statement or defended concept is obtained. This listing of A. t. methods is not exhaustive.

View value Argumentation Theoretical in other dictionaries

Argumentation- argumentation, pl. no, w. (book). Action according to verb. argue. Need argumentation. || A set of arguments. A theory supported by solid arguments.
Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary

Argumentation J.— 1. The same as: argumentation. 2. A set of arguments, arguments (1*), sufficient to prove something.
Explanatory Dictionary by Efremova

Argumentation- -And; and.
1. to Argue. A. their positions. // Method, method of proof using arguments (1 value). Clear, logical a. The position needs argumentation.
2. Totality........
Kuznetsov's Explanatory Dictionary

Argumentation of Defense, With Reference to the Current Level of Product Development— In legal practice and in liability insurance: the defendant’s objection to a lawsuit brought under manufacturer’s product liability.........
Economic dictionary

Inductive Argumentation- An attempt to use information relevant to a particular situation in order to
draw any conclusions.
Economic dictionary

Theoretical Cost— Estimated
price
option price calculated using a mathematical model such as the Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model.
Economic dictionary

Theoretical Value (Share Subscription Rights)— The mathematical relationship between the market value of the subscription right for shares after the announcement of an offer of securities, but before the shares begin to be sold.......
Economic dictionary

Theoretical Futures Price— Equilibrium
futures price
contract. See also Fair price (
acceptable price).
Economic dictionary

Total Theoretical Productivity (tp)— a measure of computing performance, expressed in millions of theoretical operations per second (Mtops), obtained by aggregating computational elements.
Legal Dictionary

Argumentation- - statement of certain judgments, arguments (arguments). PR and advertising do not always resort to purely logical justification when stating theses and formulating evidence.........
Psychological Encyclopedia

Validity Theoretical (Constructive validity)— - in relation to psychodiagnostic methods means the correspondence of the results of psychodiagnostics carried out using this method to the indicators of those psychological......
Psychological Encyclopedia

Set, Theoretical Model— In general, any model in which the units in question are understood as elements that make up a set, and the relationships between the elements are formally represented in terms of......
Psychological Encyclopedia

Theoretical Psychology— (theoretical psychology) The two main aspects of technical psychology are the construction of a substantial (basic) theory and a metatheory. Substance theory is intended to explain........
Psychological Encyclopedia

Argumentation- (lat. argumentatio) - a concept denoting a logical-communicative process that serves to substantiate a certain point of view for the purpose of its perception, understanding and (or) ......
Sociological Dictionary

Sampling Theoretical— - the method of forming a sample population for case studies, is also used in forming focus groups and planning experiments with selected........
Sociological Dictionary

Construct Theoretical Validity— - the property of some indicator (measure) to behave as expected in accordance with the theory.
Sociological Dictionary

Sociology Theoretical— -English sociology, theoretical; German Soziologie, theoretische. Sociology, focused on the objective scientific study of society in order to obtain theoretical knowledge, giving........
Sociological Dictionary

Theoretical Sampling— - a sample that is based on a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon being studied and its variability. Each individual in such a sample is selected based on the general........
Sociological Dictionary

Theoretical Dilemma- (theoretical dilemma). A theoretical problem that has been at the center of debate for a long time.
Sociological Dictionary

Theoretical Model of the Subject of Research (TMPI)— a set of logically interrelated abstract concepts that describe the subject area of ​​research.
Sociological Dictionary

Theoretical (fundamental) Sociology— - the highest level of sociological knowledge, summarizing the data of empirical sociology. Scaling - grouping based on logically identified features........
Sociological Dictionary

ARGUMENTATION— ARGUMENTATION, -i, g. 1. see argue. 2. A set of arguments (in 1 value). || adj. argumentative, -aya, -oe.
Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary